(THIS ARTICLE IS MACHINE TRANSLATED by Google from Norwegian)
By: Ragnar Næs and Jørgen Lorentzen
What is happening in Turkey today is both a dramatic course change in the country's relationship with the West and a continuation of the problems the Turks have had in developing a functioning democracy. It is dramatic because, since the end of the 1700 century, the Turks have been trying to emulate the model Europeans were developing – and a continuation of the problems because there are now new abuses of power against the people of a country where reformers have never quite succeeded in develop a functioning democracy. There were good efforts in 1876, as progressive Ottomans launched the world's first multicultural parliament consisting of Turks, Arabs, Jews, Greeks and Armenians – and then in the period 1909 – 1913. Both attempts failed as a result of war and imperialist aggression from Russia and the West. But with Atatürk and Kemalism, Turkey finally got its "western model" in the form of an authoritarian secular government.
The importance of democracy was nevertheless gradually understood in the country. Turkey – like a number of other countries – introduced parliamentarism in 1945, and after Adnan Menderes' Democrat Party swept the Kemalists off the field in 1950, a real change of government took place. The military leaders then went to President Inönü, Atatürk's friend and successor, and offered to remove the democratically elected opposition. But Inönü is said to have replied that after so many years of boasting about Western values and being supporters of democracy, they had to follow this up in practice. Menderes became president, but responded by inserting his political supporters into the state apparatus; and in 1960 the Kemalists took revenge, deposed Menderes by coup, hanged him and purged the state apparatus of his followers. We see here the logic that was repeated in the later military coups in 1971 and 1980. Today, the same thing happens with Recep Tayyip Erdogan at the helm.
Erdogan is fighting not only for his political life, but also to avoid going to prison.
Erdogan's emergence. Erdogan had his political start under Necmettin Erbakan, who from the 70s sought to create a place for political Islam in Turkey. Erdogan eventually took over the leadership role in Erbakan's party, but was sentenced to prison for "so divisive" when in 1998 he wrote a poem containing the following phrase: "The mosque is our barracks, the dome is our helmet, the minarets are our bayonets." After his imprisonment he founded "Ak Party" – "The White / Pure Party". In 2002, the party became the country's largest by a constituency, and came into government position. The electoral victory happened in collaboration with the group "Hizmet" ("Service"), started by imam Fethullah Gülen. This was also a religious movement, but politically they were supporters of parliamentary democracy.
The first political earthquake to indicate that Erdogan's power was under threat and that he himself began to use undemocratic funds came in December 2013. A number of state attorneys arrested 52 of Erdogan's closest associates and supporters of corruption, money laundering, smuggling and smuggling of gold in connection with a secret "oil for gold" transaction with Iran. Erdogan deposed the lawyers and police who had been responsible for the arrests. Over the next two years, hundreds of presidential opponents were arrested on dubious grounds, and resigned from their positions or both. Liberal opposition newspapers were shut down or taken over by government-minded people. In hindsight, it is quite clear that those who reported Erdogan's supporters in 2013 were most likely linked to the "Hizmet" movement. Erdogan himself was implicated in the spreading of telephone conversations where he apparently discussed with his son how to get rid of black money. As some critics, Erdogan is not only fighting for his political life, but also for avoiding going to jail. The scandal in December 2013 was the start of a series of conflicts where every confrontation to date has ended with more power to Erdogan.
Perhaps the most important of these was the Kurds in Turkey. Abdullah Öcalan, the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK's) imprisoned leader, supported Erdogan until 2015 because he gave the impression of wanting to resolve the Kurdish conflict with conditions they could accept. The Kurds had also founded a number of parties since the 90s, all of which were banned in turn – and then emerged with a new name and new programs. The latest to date is the party HDP, which in the June 2015 election broke the parliamentary block and made Erdogan's party lose the absolute majority.
After attempts to form a coalition that could stand against Erdogan's Justice and Development Party (AKP) collapsed in the summer of 2015, Erdogan announced new elections in November – and regained the majority in parliament. One factor that came into play in this context was that Turkey began to bomb the PKK's detention center just across the border with northern Iraq, provoking a little thoughtful rebellion by the PKK. The war is still going on, albeit to a much smaller extent than in the 90s. The Kurds were neutralized as politically active, and more than 100 of the leaders of the HDP are imprisoned today – including leader Selahattin Demirtas.
Erdogan began to pursue a more aggressive foreign policy early than his predecessors. Most spectacular was his demand that President Assad in Syria resign after the demonstrations in spring 2011. He sent lorries with weapons to support Syrian rebels, an operation carried out by the Secret Security Service (MIT). Prosecutors and local military in Adana province stopped the trucks and arrested the MIT people. Opposition politician Enis Berberoglu of the CHP leaked information on the case to the press in May 2015. He was recently sentenced to 25 years in prison for this.
Erdogan appears as an authoritarian statesman with considerable political talent.
Mysterious bargain attempt. Mass arrests and mass redundancies of oppositionists increased dramatically after the unsuccessful coup attempt in July 2016. Almost all independent commentators with expertise in Turkey point out that the circumstances surrounding the coup attempt are still unclear. The same evening people were asked: Why did the coup makers choose to strike in the evening, when people were done at work and out in cafes, and not in the middle of the night? Why hadn't the coup makers made sure to capture the president and prime minister at the very beginning of the coup attempt? The authorities explanation for this was that the coup makers were informed that the security service had just been informed of their plans, which was therefore expedited. However, this does not solve the mystery.
The journalist Yavuz Baydar, now living outside Turkey, points out the following: 1) It appears that the coup plans were announced by MIT at. 14.30pm on the coup day, while the coup makers struck at. 21.00:2. Why didn't loyal forces strike immediately, and what happened during those six hours? Why did central people, including Erdogan, behave as if everything were normal? Was the President informed? 3) Immediately after the coup attempt, the authorities had clear, comprehensive lists of who was to be arrested. Were the lists written in advance? XNUMX) Incredibly, a number of key people, including the head of the Security Service (MIT) and Erdogan, were not interviewed by the commission to report on the coup attempt.
In retrospect, information has emerged in the newspaper Hÿrriet Daily News that an employee of the Turkish intelligence was informed that a coup was in progress – and that "it will be a carnage".
One explanation for these unanswered questions may, of course, be the lack of professionalism of the coup makers. Another might be that Erdogan was informed of what was going on at. 14.30 on the coup day and even took over the development – that he tipped the coup makers, via informants, at a time when he knew that people could be mobilized on the streets to support him. This version has so far not been confirmed and remains for the time being a hypothesis, but Erdogan must have excused us – in the light of lack of information and a proper investigation by the authorities – to wonder if this was not the case.
The coup attempt and the subsequent state of emergency were also the ideal pretext for pushing through the proposal for a new presidential system. The main points of this proposal are the abolition of the Prime Minister's post in favor of a president with increased powers. In the April 2017 referendum, Erdogan won by a small margin, but the victory was accompanied by a number of indications of both cheating and the lack of opportunities for the no-people to propagandize their views. International organizations rejected the vote as unsatisfactory. Yet Erdogan lost over 10 percent of the vote from the last election, indicating a declining popularity in the population.
Authoritarian management. The general human rights situation in Turkey has worsened under Erdogan. The number of convicts has risen by 232 percent since the AKP took over 15 years ago. Still, the mass arrests and terminations after the coup attempt are of a completely different order. More than 140 people have been arrested or lost; most based on allegations of connections to PKK or "Hizmet".
The authorities also confiscate the property of the convicted. After the coup attempt, an organization was created directly under the government, with the aim of taking over and managing confiscated companies. Today, it manages 858 companies worth a total of $ 15 billion. Erdogan appears as an authoritarian statesman with numerous political talents – and an intention to change the society from Atatürk's secular model to a Muslim society with dictatorial leadership, hijab for all women, restrictions on both alcohol and other "western" cultural traits. He also appears to have plans to strengthen the network of Sunni Muslim states, as well as to gain greater influence in the Middle East on a general basis.
It is important to point out that Erdogan has the support of less than 50 percent of the population, and there are indications that various opposition groups are joining forces against the dictatorship. The recently organized "justice march" that went from Ankara to Istanbul was concluded by a meeting in which it is believed that as many as 1,6 million attended. The leader of the march and of the CHP, Kilicdaroglu, took the opportunity to showcase a new side of his leadership; if he can also lead and rally the opposition to Erdogan at the next presidential election in two years, it may actually be possible with a peaceful release of the current one-man rule. Only the future will show if Erdogan succeeds in his efforts to change a Muslim country that has had a strong secular movement for nearly 100 years, or whether we will return to a new attempt to develop democracy in the country.
Also read: The case of Turkey
