(THIS ARTICLE IS MACHINE TRANSLATED by Google from Norwegian)
Two British journalists have just written a book that stands out in the swarm of books that have come on the market in connection with the current war. It provides a useful insight into the Hamas movement as it has taken shape, and especially after the last Palestinian elections held in 2006. It is partly a historical review, where you get the depiction of the movement's path into the international limelight, but first and foremost gives it a series of images of the state of the Gaza Strip and how Hamas has helped shape it.
The authors are Beverly Milton Edwards, who as a former Reuters journalist has met a number of Hamas luminaries and is now associated with The Middle East Council on Global Affairs, and Stephen Farrell, who still works in the field for Reuters.
The subtitle of the book is The Quest for Power, which is very significant. Because power is a key concept in the leadership style that the current Hamas leadership is putting forward. One still remembers the sheikh Ahmad Yassin, who formed Hamas back in the 1970s, when the movement was called something completely different. It was a humanitarian organization with strong Islamic characteristics, and even during the first intifada, which started in 1987, it was rather pragmatic in its relations with the Israeli occupying power.
There were reports of Fatah people being thrown alive from the enclave's high-rises, and Fatah, by the way, returned the same coin.
Made them into cynical survivors
This changed sharply with the new generation that is at the helm today. Unlike Yassin and his peers, the young leaders are born and raised in The Gaza Strips refugee camps. They know nothing but the harsh reality of the camps, and this has made them cynical survivors in a completely different way. This was, among other things, what unfolded after the 2006 election. Hamas won the largest number of votes, but the rival Fatah took power in the West Bank, after which Hamas did the same with unprecedented brutality in Gaza. There were reports of Fatah-people who were thrown alive from the enclave's high-rises, and Fatah, by the way, gave back with the same coin.
When the Israelis began the blockade of the Gaza Strip in 2007, things quickly went downhill, and the discontent showed itself in the population. "Fatah were corrupt, but at least the border was open", a local citizen tells the authors. Hamas showed its determination to hold on to power by creating fear. An opinion poll in 2008 showed that popular support had fallen to 19,5 per cent, while 36,8 per cent. trusted Fatah more. There is no doubt that the Israeli blockade had a crushing effect, and the situation only became more dire during recurring military confrontations. But even at its worst, Hamas got away with summary executions of Palestinian civilians who could be labeled as collaborators for one reason or another.
Hamas' uncompromising line
It is this one in total uncompromisinge line that is an important part of the story of Hamas's survival. Ismail Haniyeh was of this cast and so was Muhammed Deif, who is considered the architect of the October 7 attack. Deif was also eliminated by the Israelis this summer, and it was a significant development then Yahya Sinwar, who for a number of years had been the de facto leader of the movement in the Gaza Strip itself, was found by pure chance and killed on 16 October.
This latest development, for obvious reasons, has not been included in the book, but it does not detract from the overall picture it paints in an excellent way.
“Even in that Israel"In the intelligence community, it was understood that even if Sinwar and others wanted to liquidate, this was no guarantee that Hamas would collapse," the book reads, and this is an important point.
In the intervening years since 2007, Hamas has created a system that distinguishes between the ordinary and increasingly disaffected civilian population and the absolute loyalists who hold it together with the undisguised use of force.
Hamas has always had a territorial advantage, and behind the leaders stands the next line of loyal followers ready to take over when necessary. Israel left the Gaza Strip in connection with the evacuation of the area's settlements in the late summer of 2005, and in an intelligence sense, this is a minor eternity in which much has been able to develop. The Israelis have thus discovered how extensive Hamas's tunnel system was and to a certain extent still is. The book's authors state that in 2016 alone, more than 3 million tons of construction materials were brought into the Gaza Strip, and only barely half were ever used for civil construction.
An opinion poll in 2008 showed that popular support had fallen to 19,5 per cent, while 36,8 per cent. trusted Fatah more.
All of this is scary reading that also puts some useful perspective. And since the book certainly does not let up in the depiction of Israel's brutal behavior in the Gaza Strip, it creates a helicopter view that sees a series of misunderstandings and misjudgments on both sides. As a sort of conclusion, one can therefore say that while the civilian population of the Gaza Strip is largely seen as being taken hostage in a bloody conflict, the Israeli blockade over the past several years has led to a radicalization by the leadership of Hamas, which previously could show a certain willingness to compromise, but which now stands even more firmly on a number of fundamental positions which are completely ultimate.
