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Experience with NATO – 20 years after

OPINION AGAINST NATO / While NATO's foreign ministers are gathered in Washington to hold cheers for the Alliance's excellence, public opinion against NATO is getting stronger in member states.




(THIS ARTICLE IS MACHINE TRANSLATED by Google from Norwegian)

In Denmark, a brochure has recently been published, «NATO position and documentation», which contains a number of important articles, information and quotations. One of the articles is written by Preben Wilhjelm and deals with the experiences with NATO, both in terms of relaxation and the relationship with the third world. It follows here in an abridged and revised edition. (ORIENTERING APRIL 12, 1969)

After twenty years of NATO membership, two experiences are particularly important when deciding on future security policy, and which are common to the two military blocs:

1) Whatever the purpose of the blocs, they are far more instruments for securing the dominance of the superpowers over their lesser allies, than instruments for common security towards the opposing party.

2) After all, the relaxation we have experienced in Europe over the last ten years has not come because of, but despite the blocks. The threat of democratization in Czechoslovakia did not come from the west, but from the country's own alliance partner. The threat to the democratic forces in Spain and Portugal does not come from the east, but from the military leaders of these countries and their allies. The threat to Greek democracy does not come from the east, but from the domestic reactionary forces, backed by Greece's allies. The threat to democratic forces in France does not come from the east, but from the country's own military, and in a given situation also from the NATO aid de Gaulle had applied for last year, if his own troops would not be able to keep the population down.

Lost independence

Any NATO discussion often ends with a claim against a claim. What would have happened to our country without NATO has to remain a guess. What we can state with absolute certainty, however, is that we have lost some of our independence through membership. This refers not only to the restrictions that appear from the written agreements, but to the non-treaty submission that has led to clear differences in e.g. Swedish and Danish foreign policy. One could say that this is the price of having preserved most of our independence, but then we are immediately left to guess. However, if we look at the concrete experiences or twenty years, we may be able to more easily understand some of NATO's true nature. During these years, NATO's various member countries have been militarily involved with crews and materiel in a wide range of conflicts. Without resorting to reference books, one can instantly mention the following: Indonesia, Iran, Korea, Guatemala, Kenya, Indo-China, Cyprus, Algeria, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, Cuba, Aden, Congo, Laos, Angola, Guinea, Mozambique . The Dominican Republic, Vietnam, etc. In each of these cases, it is either a war for their own, colonial interests or support for reactionary regimes and coup plotters who oppose popular movements for social reform. And what is even more revealing: not a single example of NATO intervention that has benefited the forces of democracy can be mentioned! It can certainly not be due to lack of opportunities, not only in Greece, Rhodesia and South Africa, but also in most of the countries mentioned above.

NATO supporters would argue that it has never been NATO as such that has been involved in all these acts of war. But it is to close one's eyes to the bitter reality if one believes that such unequivocal evidence of the member states' commitments does not say anything about the nature of the alliance. By the way, in almost all cases our government has shown moral solidarity with the Allies until the eleventh hour – and then, as usual, tries to explain the actions of the alliance partners as a purely tragic mistake. But it can not have much to do with analysis to talk about tragic mistakes when they occur in dozens of cases, and following the same pattern.

The war crimes of recent years in Vietnam have drawn more and more attention to this pattern, and people have therefore begun to talk about a new NATO, a kind of NATO as a tool of relaxation. But how has the experience been in this area in recent years?

re rearmament

The first period was marked by German-American pressure in the direction of West German rearmament and accession to NATO. The rearmament began in 1952, and the pressure for NATO membership grew. The Eastern European fear of a militarily strong Germany can be understood or not, but it is a reality that has always influenced the policies of these countries. In the years in question, the Soviet Union went to great lengths to prevent West German armaments from gaining momentum through NATO membership.

A decisive situation was reached in the Disarmament Commission in Geneva in 1955. The Western powers first set out their "six principles" which were rejected by the Soviets, but which the Western countries put forward meeting after meeting. On May 10, 1955, it came as a complete surprise that the Soviet delegation came up with an eight-point plan, which was in fact a copy of Western principles. At no time, neither before nor since, have there been such close agreements on balanced and controlled disarmament.

The Western delegations immediately called for a halt to the negotiations. For four months, they rejected all Russian attempts to discuss the proposals. It was not until September that a meeting was held again, and here the Soviet proposals were rejected, after which the Western countries declared that their own "six principles" were no longer in force either.

The situation in May 1955, which has been called the "moment of hope", was without a doubt of the greatest importance for later development. In the immediate context, West Germany's accession to NATO followed (without Denmark and Norway exercising their veto), and then came the creation of the Warsaw Pact. The following years, however, offered several Soviet initiatives in the direction of balanced, controlled disarmament (see here: "The Arms Race", written by the English disarmament expert Philip Noel-Baker, who stood on the right wing of the Labor Party). They were all rejected by Western powers, and so were initiatives such as the Rapacki Plan and the Gomulka Plan.

power Balance

In all years, our security policy has been based on a dogma that all downsizing must be balanced. The mystification called "balance of power" has become a sleeping pad that has exempted the government from doing anything. But when did the famous "balance of power" exist? If it was established with NATO in 1949, then it would have to go in the sink when the Soviet Union got the hydrogen bomb? If it existed in 1955, could it not have existed unchanged when the Soviet Union received intercontinental missiles? The thing is, of course, that there has never been a delicate balance that made it risky to take the slightest step.

Ever since 1952, there has been a commission under the UN negotiating balanced and controlled disarmament. Here, in reality, it is the blocs that negotiate, and the most striking thing about the relaxation that has actually taken place is that it is in no way the result of such negotiations. The scriptures have been one-sided, and they have always been met with distrust and reluctance on the part of the superpower in question. The Soviet Union was more than skeptical of the Polish independence expressed through initiatives such as the Rapacki and Gomulka plans. They did not advance either, as the western countries were dismissive. Later things went a little better when Romania loosened the ties a bit, and France made a similar maneuver in relation to NATO. The Soviet Union and the United States became very anxious, but it turns out that small countries do not find themselves being driven tight in one block if there are signs of dissolution in the other. This means that the one-sided steps are not in fact one-sided, but that they are answered quickly. It has been far too slow, but the important thing in this connection is that it is this relaxation mechanism that has actually worked, while for 16 years people have tried to use the blocks as relaxation instruments without a single result.

Of course, the one-sided step method also has its limitations. Czechoslovakia tried to use it, and it was said to stop. But it is a distorted logic that causes some to use Czechoslovakia's fate in the argument for continued membership in NATO: What the Czechoslovakians were striving for was precisely to become more independent in relation to the dominant superpower. When Danish politicians express sympathy for these efforts, but at the same time make it clear that they are not willing to take steps to dissolve the other bloc, it is not only illogical, but a direct mockery of the Czechoslovaks.

block Policy

The development within each of the two blocks is strongly influenced by what happens in the other block. Dissolution in one place will inevitably lead to dissolution in the other place. This process is just beginning, but it is us, the small countries in the Western bloc, who have been most reluctant.

The smaller countries have a common interest in breaking down the blocks. What we should therefore do here at the end of NATO's 20 – year period was to use all our political energy and imagination to find alternative solutions instead of a continued contribution to bloc politics. The basis for such investigations must be a clear recognition that small countries such as Denmark and Norway cannot be defended militarily without total destruction, and that our security is therefore more in relaxation than in armaments. All relevant alternatives should be investigated, including the possibilities for the Nordic Neutrality Association, participation in a neutral zone that includes smaller eastern and western countries, and isolated neutrality. The Left Socialists (VS) put forward such a proposal to study alternatives during the foreign policy debate in the autumn of 196, but it was rejected. The Minister of Foreign Affairs stated shortly afterwards in the NATO Council of Ministers that there is no alternative to NATO. But how can one know for sure when one rejects all proposals for studies?

Also read: Our dear NATO

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