(THIS ARTICLE IS MACHINE TRANSLATED by Google from Norwegian)
The 10. – 11. In October, a conference was held in Vadsø: "Military intelligence as a democratic blind zone". It was organized by Bård Wormdal and Mediation Power in Vadsø, by the University of Tromsø, Barents Press in Norway and Russia and Norwegian PEN. The conference gathered around a hundred people: journalists, researchers and local politicians, former Defense Minister and leader of the EOS Committee Eldbjørg Løwer, the Labor Party's Kåre Simensen from Finnmark, the Foreign and Defense Committee and an American and a Russian scientist. The day before, the conference was announced in Aftenposten by the Chief of Intelligence, Lieutenant General Morten Haga Lunde, and the following day the same theme was presented by Defense Minister Ine Eriksen Søreide in VG. They emphasized the importance of not disclosing secret information, as if they were worried that retired people from Vadsø or Vardø would begin to share their experience. When it comes to names and sources, it is understandable that they are kept secret – but some individuals' description of the extent, focus and significance of intelligence for the United States must not be kept secret. This knowledge is an essential prerequisite for a real democratic conversation about Norwegian security policy. If Norwegians had really understood the importance of Norwegian intelligence, Norway would not have had to lay down and be seduced by the American and British war adventures in North Africa and the Middle East.
Avoided nuclear attack. An example: At the crucial meeting in Washington in 1987 on the Kongsberg – Toshiba case, Richard Perle (Secretary of State to the US Secretary of Defense) wanted to punish Norway. However, this was stopped by the then head of Naval Intelligence Bill Studeman (who had previously worked for Robert Bathurst). Studeman said that over 90 percent of all audio signatures from Soviet submarines – which the United States had in its archives and which made it possible for Americans to identify the sound from each individual Soviet submarine – came from Norwegian intelligence. Norwegian intelligence was far too important. Punishing Norway should only hit back at the United States itself. It was not in American interest, Studeman thought. But it also means that as long as there is no war, Norwegian-American intelligence cooperation is first and foremost a protection against American measures against Norway. Richard Perle did not win. Norway can retain some political independence. We do not have to take part in American and British adventures in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Syria. Northern Norway and the Kola Peninsula are still "the most valuable piece of real estate on earth", to quote former US Secretary of the Navy John Lehman. Norway does not have to ask for support from the United States. Northern Norway is of crucial importance for American thinking, and the United States will intervene in a crisis situation in the north, regardless of whether the Norwegian government wants it or not.
Good intelligence is often just what can prevent a war. At the NATO exercise Able Archer in November 1983, leading Western politicians participated in preparations for the introduction of nuclear weapons. The exercise seemed so realistic to the Soviet Politburo that leader Yuri Andropov was convinced that NATO was starting a nuclear war against the Soviets. The Soviet missile forces were ordered to be on high alert, and Soviet bombers with nuclear weapons stood with roaring engines, ready to take off. But East Germany had an agent, Rainer Rupp ("Topas"), at NATO headquarters outside Brussels. He knew it was just an exercise, and he managed to stop the Soviet nuclear attack. Had he not managed it, cities such as Vardø and Vadsø would have been laid in ruins within a few minutes.
False evidence. Professional intelligence is absolutely necessary to expose political manipulation of the public. Today's media accident prophecies that speak of a "Russian threat" lack grounding in reality. Swedish media talk about a threat from Russian submarines – but there are only two Russian submarines in the Baltic Sea (against 40-50 in the 1980s), and they are mostly at the quay. SIPRI's studies of Russia's conventional forces show that they have less than a tenth of the capacity we find on the western side. The fact that Russia is building up these forces is important so that Moscow does not immediately resort to nuclear weapons when they experience a threat from the west. Norwegian intelligence could have revealed that there is no serious threat, just as it did in the 1980s. At the time, the Foreign Ministry's Councilor Kjeld Vibe, who trusted the American media more, thought that the Russians still played twice, while the head of intelligence Alf Roar Berg (Studeman's "opposite number" in the 1990s as head of the NSA and acting CIA chief) knew what happened on the Soviet side, and that it partly agreed with Russian rhetoric. Norway must also be able to assess what is politically manipulated intelligence – such as the CIA's false evidence of chemical and biological weapons, which was produced to legitimize the war in Iraq in 2003. Not to mention the false allegations of a threat to civilians in Benghazi, which was produced in Paris to legitimize the Libyan war in 2011. The Norwegian government was then, for lack of its own intelligence, completely manipulated by allied services. The only recipe for this is greater transparency.
Relaxation. In 2015, Bård Wormdal published the book spy base. Here he writes that Philip E. Coyle (US Secretary of State for the Secretary of Defense 1994–2001) confirms that the Globus II radar in Vardø is very important for the US missile defense. It can be used to follow rocket tests in Russia, but it can also see the difference between Russian rockets and other objects in space. It can also record the exact trajectories of the rockets. This makes the radar an important instrument in missile defense. According to the American researcher George Lewis, who participated in the conference, this applies even more to the new Globus III radar that will be built for Vardø by 2020. Philip E. Coyle, who has also been responsible for the US test and evaluation, says that all radar data must go directly to the command in the United States. "There is no time for people in Norway and elsewhere to take part in this process," he says. Norwegian national control appears to be limited here. At the same time, we know that the missile defense risks undermining Russia's strategic capacity, and according to the strategic thinking that applies in the United States and Russia, the missile defense will thus open up for a possible American attack. It must be assumed that Russia will turn off the Vardø radar during the first minutes of a conflict – something that would put Washington in front of the choice to strike immediately, which is basically destabilizing.
The conference concluded that Norway's central role for Western intelligence is partly stabilizing and partly destabilizing. Intelligence is stabilizing because the interception from, for example, Vadsø provides precise knowledge of the other party's abilities and intentions. The risk of misunderstandings decreases and we have the opportunity to deny the media's accident prophecies when the transparency of the intelligence is greater. On the other hand, the new Vardø radar can be used in the US missile defense. It could undermine Russia's strategic capacity, and open up the risk of a first blow. The question we must ask ourselves is whether the local "derby" between Vadsø and Vardø is not about football, but about an opening for global relaxation versus the risk that decision-makers in crisis situations see no other option than an American-Russian nuclear war.
Also read: The book review of spy base
