(THIS ARTICLE IS MACHINE TRANSLATED by Google from Norwegian)
There was a clear strategy behind it when Hamas launched its bloody attack on southern Israel on October 7, 2023. The fact that it took the Israelis to such a large extent may have gotten behind Yahya Sinwar and other of the movement's leaders in Gaza, but as calculated, Israel reacted with great ferocity.
In this way, the Palestinian cause has once again come to the top of the global agenda, and Hamas can also be said to have succeeded in the second part of the strategy, which was to set other parts of the region on fire. From Lebanon, Hezbollah began firing rockets at northern Israel, and Iran also asserted itself, but the government in Tehran refrained from a direct, military confrontation with the Israelis.
However, one can rightly say that the relationship between Israel and the Gaza Strip within the past year has moved dramatically from a deep crisis with some almost irrational elements of cooperation to a meltdown. It is this process that the British journalist Jamie Stern-Weiner describes through 13 essays that he has collected in a new book, and overall it gives a very precise description of the tragic situation.
Hamas seeks compromise
The 13 contributors range from academics with many years of insight into the conflict to activists and others who, on a more personal level, have at least as deep a commitment. However, what stands out is that the quality is rather fluctuating.
Professor emeritus from Oxford University and author of the classic The Iron Wall Avi Shlaim, is responsible for the book's foreword and the first essay, a large overview article, which is solid work, but also predictable. And Sara Roy from Harvard University, who in 2011 wrote the exceptionally good one Hamas and Civil Society in Gaza, also seems dry and uninspired in his contribution to the book, Econocide in Gaza.
It is when we come to Colter Louwerse that the idea of the book really takes off. He is among the younger researchers with great insight into Palestinian conditions, and he tackles the prevailing myth that it is impossible to negotiate with Hamas in an original way.
Right after October 7, Israel argued that it had no choice but to eliminate Hamas because the movement's Islamic ideology stood in the way of any recognition of the state of Israel. It has often been argued that Hamas regards all of Palestine as waqf, i.e. inalienable Islamic heritage, which must not be renounced in any way, and in this connection the Israelis initially received widespread support among Western leaders in particular. Even the progressive American politician Bernie Sanders rejected the idea of "a permanent ceasefire with an organization like Hamas, which is bent on destroying the state of Israel."
Louwerse argues that over the past 15 years, Hamas has attempted a line of negotiation, but that the Israeli leadership, i.e. primarily Benyamin Netanyahu, has consistently rejected the approaches. The basis for this is partly a piece of Israeli habitual thinking, which also has its real political advantages. It is based on previous times, when people refused to negotiate with Yasser Arafat and the PLO with the same fervor, until a new reality set in and the parties met at the Oslo agreements in 1993.
Peace in the region could come into question if the Israelis withdrew to the 1967 borders.
Hamas will similarly be able to seek compromise, he writes. The opponents tend to stick stubbornly to the movement's charter from 1988, which, among other things, writes about the decisive battle for the whole of Palestine, but there are many indications that this position does not really exist anymore. In the Palestinian elections in 2006, Hamas ran, even though it had refused to participate shortly before, and it scored a solid electoral victory. It led to the seizure of power in Gaza and in 2007 the Israeli blockade, which put Hamas in a new role with great responsibility. It is this development that leads Louwerse to conclude that Hamas realized the necessity of a compromise, which already in 2006 led the then Hamas leader, Khaled Meshal, to state that peace in the region could well come into question if the Israelis withdrew return to the 1967 borders.
No intifada in the West Bank
Not everyone will share this interpretation of the development, but Louwerse argues well and validly, and this is the kind that gives the book its very special value.
The same can largely be said of Musa Abuhashhash, who is among the contributors with an activist background. He is a former employee of the Israeli human rights group B'tselem, and he served in Hebron, where he also lives.
The Palestinian population in the West Bank is already deeply rooted in relative material prosperity.
Abuhashhash gives a sensible and surprising answer to why Hamas failed to set the West Bank on fire. The radical settlers in the area have otherwise done their part to antagonize the Palestinian civilian population, and many observers had expected that the events of 7 October would almost automatically lead to a new and even more violent intifada.
In his analysis, the explanation is quite obvious. The Palestinian Authority in Ramallah remained silent when it all broke out in Gaza. Fatah, which is the main faction in the PLO, has been in opposition to Hamas for many years, and from here they prioritized security and stability right from the start and therefore continued the established cooperation with the Israeli authorities. And for its part, the Palestinian population in the West Bank is already deeply rooted in the relative material prosperity that Ramallah's cooperation with Jerusalem has led to, and since the Gaza Strip has already been seen for a number of years going into a state of crisis in almost all areas, not many want to see yourself in the same situation.
This sounds disillusioned, and it probably is. But it is probably part of the prevailing state of affairs, which the book describes in the finest way.
