(THIS ARTICLE IS MACHINE TRANSLATED by Google from Norwegian)
The last book by the philosopher and sociologist Jürgen Habermas (b. 1929) was The new
the public (Cappelen Damm 2023). In a new publication, Habermas now talks with two colleagues: the sociologist Stefan Müller-Doohm (b. 1942), who in 2014 published a brick of a Habermas biography, and the philosopher Roman Yos (b. 1979), who has previously published a study of the history of ideas about the young Habermas in the period 1952-62.
Despite Habermas's imminent 96th birthday, there are many fresh thoughts in this book. The oral form brings Habermas's often abstract technical terminology to life.
Criticism of capitalism without revolution
According to Habermas, capitalism cannot be overthrown by revolution as Marx thought. Its destructive forces must be tamed from within. And he criticizes the individualistic aspect of frihetone when it comes at the expense of solidarityand equal treatment.
Habermas' theory of the contradiction between system and lifeworld sprang from the paradigm of capitalism's internal contradictions. The much-discussed "colonization of the lifeworld" well describes the increasing marketization of all relationships that we see today. Philosopher Arne Johan vetlesen has indeed pointed out in an apt critique (Sosiologisk tidsskrift 2006) that the life world is not necessarily an alternative to the system – it is already often infected by lifestyle advertising and human capital management. "What's in it for me" and strategic thinking are making their presence felt.
We do not understand the habits and routines we ourselves are subject to. This transcendence creates a space for religiosity.
“What keeps me going is the problem of how a fragile social life that is constantly being torn apart can succeed,” writes Habermas. He modestly strives to make the world a little better – hence the title. Things had to get better.
Personal characteristics
Several German reviewers have already claimed that the book is too self-explanatory: Habermas refers to too many unknown people! For anyone who has studied a little philosophy – or can Google – this should not be a problem. Habermas has had contact with an astonishing number of prominent thinkers, not only in Germany, but also in England and the United States. At the back of the book is a register of over two hundred names. Habermas has not met everyone personally: Kant and Hegel have the most references. But then come Theodor W. Adorno (1903–69) and Karl-Otto Apel (1922–2017); he knew both well.
Habermas emphasizes Ornaments "brilliant spiritual physiognomy – his chiseled (engraved) language, vigilant intelligence and the impossibility of not thinking” (p. 43). More such mini-portraits would have made the book even better. For example, Habermas was in close contact with the famous philosophers Karl Löwith (1897–1973) and Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900–2002) in Heidelberg.
Original thoughts are associated with persons. In philosophy, whims play a more important role than in the individual sciences, which follow stricter methods. Habermas therefore concludes the conversation by saying that “every original philosophical thought seeks a literary, an unmistakable form of expression” (p. 230). Is this really the same man who insists on universalization in both communicative action and deliberative democracy?
Weber and the rationalization process
The sociologist Max Weber (1864–1920) described the development of society as a process of rationalization: Forms of government began as charismatic rule, were then built on tradition, and with modernity became increasingly rational or legally based. This also led to a so-called differentiation of what Weber called value spheres: science and technology, art and law and morality.
Weber wanted more charismatic people in politics.
Against this the disenchantment (Disenchantment) of the world, Weber wanted more charismatic people in politics. He died before this wish was realized in the German interwar period. What about the rest that does not fit into the rationalization process? Habermas has previously formulated it as an "unrecognized cognitive potential."
Habermas's growing interest in Religion can be interpreted as a symptom that the concept of rationality with which he initially operated was too narrow. His basic project was, to boil it down to one sentence – to combine Weber's description of rationalization and differentiation of value spheres with the philosophy of language and speech act theory. But when the rationalization of the social in the philosophy of language turns into an emphasis on the religious, was there perhaps something wrong with the project in the first place?
The linguistic turn
Habermas' starting point is "the linguistic constitution of human existence, how communicative experiences in a secular way create social individuals." The formulation is characterized by philosophical terminology, such as "constitution" and "communicative experience" – far from the original literary form he now emphasizes.
Habermas distinguishes between three paradigms in the history of philosophy, a development from metaphysics about subject philosophy to philosophy of languageHe himself was decisively influenced by the latter, the so-called linguistic turn in philosophy.
At the back of the book is a register with over two hundred names.
Ludwig Wittgensteins late philosophy assumed that language use involved more than the use of language: Language acts were embedded in practices that were in turn parts of an entire way of life. How? Habermas has no definitive answer to that. Suddenly he launches an expanded concept of reason by emphasizing the knowledge-based ("epistemic") content of feelings, desires, moods and sensations. He now describes these as "bodily resources of reason" rooted in the inner nature of man.
Suddenly he launches an expanded concept of reason by emphasizing the content of emotions, desires, moods, and sensations.
But this is something different from the truth and validity claims in the communicative acts that he previously took as his starting point. What is the difference between the "bodily resources of reason" and what he negatively terms "regression"? How do non-linguistic situational understanding and the life world stand in relation to linguistic communication that is subject to truth and validity claims? Habermas's now more recent approach to religion in the comprehensive two-volume work Also a history of philosophy ("Also a history of philosophy", 2019) becomes understandable from such issues.
Religion and the world of life
Habermas now defines the real task of philosophy as “to explicate the preunderstanding that everyone inevitably has, with the help of the knowledge that is available.” (90) There is much we do not know about our preunderstanding, what the lifeworld consists of, and how it influences us. Thus, ultimately, it is also a mystery what carries our various language acts. The central point for Habermas is to investigate how language "floats on the lifeworld."
A 'lifeworld' contains many strange things and is often not an alternative to anything. Without habits and automated skills, the individual and society would quickly come to a standstill. Ultimately, we do not know how and in what way such lifeworld competence is stored and is related to our biological needs and our relationship to others. If we stretch it far enough, the background to almost all actions is a bit of a mystery. We do not understand the habits and routines to which we ourselves are subject. This transcendence creates a space for religiosity, not only when we bang on the table or are a little more anxious on Friday the 13th, but also when our morning coffee is prepared according to a specific ritual.
Everyone carries out more or less unconscious patterns of action that they do not have full insight into. Some are destructive, while others function as what philosopher Peter Sloterdijk calls 'self-improvement exercises' or 'immunization strategies'. They provide security, increase self-esteem and make life livable. Philosophy and religion, as well as psychology and a number of other sciences, fight to understand or redefine the incomprehensible in our lifeworld.
Negative phenomena in the lifeworld also become a problem in Habermas' secular post-metaphysical philosophy. He emphasizes that it is something we have not understood by populismn and increasing anomie conditions in society (p. 154). How does one explain the irrational potential? Habermas, for example, laments the relapse into a war mentality in Germany.
Habermas laments the relapse into a war mentality in Germany.
Man cannot fail to learn, Habermas claims. It is characterized by sociocultural learning. When one considers the folly of the world, one may doubt that this is correct.
What is certain, however, is that you will learn something new about Habermas by reading this book.
