(THIS ARTICLE IS MACHINE TRANSLATED by Google from Norwegian)
In recent years, and especially in connection with the redundancies in Renault and Danone, we have encountered slogans that try to convince of the unproblematic nature of closing factories. It is a matter of achieving zero redundancies, as the general secretary of the French trade union CFDT, Nicole Notat, puts it. "Restructuring and retraining plans must be made so that between 95 and 100 percent of the employees get new work," said Denis Kessler, vice president of the French employers' association Medef, in connection with the Danone case.
On March 12, 1999, the last factory of the transnational pants manufacturer Levi Strauss closed. In La Bassée, outside Lens, 541 people were laid off, of which 86 percent were women. They were transferred to a relocation unit to secure new jobs. But what has happened to them since? How many have been given work? And to what salary and terms?
If you look into this more closely, you will find a telling answer: no one knows.
No matter who you talk to: the company itself, the company Essel – chosen and paid by Levi Strauss to provide employment for the dismissed – the municipality, the elected representatives; everywhere the answer is the same: no follow-up has been carried out since the restructuring unit was closed down a year ago. In its final report, dated 28 February last year, Essel wrote that 161 redundancies had found new work or were in education. Only 35 were on the waiting list for permanent work. And 28 received social security for the elderly unemployed. In practice, this means that they were waiting for early retirement.
The state has no other figures. At the end of August this year, the county governor launched an investigation into the case, at the request of a member of parliament. But the local employment offices are not obliged to classify the unemployed according to which company they have been employed in. Jöelle Martins, former shop steward for CFDT at the factory, tried to settle the status this summer: – We are 200 who have found something. And then I think I'm optimistic.
For the seamstresses of jeans 501, at best 60 per cent, at worst 30 per cent, have found new work. The slogans have been ineffective.
Why not more funds?
It is primarily the San Francisco headquarters that are responsible. – I would like to know more about how redundancies can get new work, emphasizes Paul Scheltens, HR manager for the European Levi Strauss factories. But the multinational company has launched a series of measures to avoid liability for employees when a factory closes.
First, they have paid severance pay above the legal minimum, despite the fact that these "parachutes" – which do not increase the possibility of getting a new job – are today strongly criticized.
Secondly, the conversion unit has only had a short duration. – Ten months, everyone knows that it is insufficient for a company the size of Levi Strauss. Two years would be better, says Claude Jacquin in the accounting firm Anadex. – Based on the recent restructuring in France, companies should have been obliged to achieve concrete results in this work, no matter how long it may take.
Thirdly, the company chooses to follow the restructuring agreement rather than the leave agreement: – In contrast to the restructuring agreement, the leave agreement presupposes that the employment contract is broken at the beginning of the restructuring period, and not at the end of this, says Frédéric Bruggemann at the law firm Syndex. – In this way, the company says: I am not interested in the results.
This lack of interest partly explains the qualitative and quantitatively poor results of the conversion unit. A dozen female workers interviewed in May and June 2000 unanimously criticized the unit's poor goal attainment.
And finally: Levi Strauss refused to hand over the factory for a symbolic sum, one franc, to the regional council for the Lille area and preferred to sell to a private buyer. There is still no new industry in the premises.
Instead of all this, more funds should have been invested. Most of the women had worked in the factory from the age of 15-18 without a diploma, or with a professional seamstress. In the former mining area at Lens, unemployment was 16,5 percent in September 2000. Or three percentage points higher than in the province of Nord-Pas-de-Calais, which is again four percentage points above the average in France, which is 9,5 percent.
The company escaped
Against this background, it is difficult to see that Levi Strauss has respected the Working Environment Act, since it states that a social plan “shall help staff to retrain and new work when dismissals are unavoidable, and especially older employees and employees where social or professional conditions do especially difficult to return to work. " But the authorities let the company escape without requiring more than a parachute and ten months of conversion unit.
Corporate freedom has outweighed all other factors – which is typical of our time – and the multinational company could escape its obligations without being stigmatized. The responsibility was placed on the workers' shoulders. They are the ones who are now being blamed for not being "willing" or "good enough" to get a new job.
Levi Strauss, Essel and the authorities have all used the same arguments. A senior official at the employment service ANPE says it like this: – This is a typical example of how workers who have worked all their lives in the same factory have problems. There are many women here. Low mobility, and relatively high wages for the sector and the region.
This line of thinking, which places more emphasis on the superficial than on more fundamental reasons, also explains that Essel writes in its final report that "169 people did not want help with retraining or new work."
Essel writes further about "great fear of change," and about "people who do not want new work." But without coming to the conclusion that one should have tried to get hold of these people instead of leaving them to themselves.
After the closure of the factory, the workers were broken down by what they perceived as a collective disqualification, the company's tumultuous promises and the government's indifference. Levi Strauss let the workers live as in an incubator, with specialized work, support from the company in private problems, and organized transport to and from work.
Global reorganization
The term "lifelong learning" was an unknown word in the factory. – During our 30-year career, we were not trained to do anything other than serve Levis. We have never been taught what it means to be a job seeker, says Jöelle Martins. – In retrospect, I see that people were pressured while they were still exhausted after losing their jobs. They were pushed too early for a new job. They should have been able to breathe out for three months, and rebuild their health with medical and psychological support. After such a period, they could fully benefit from the retraining measures. It was when these stopped that people needed them.
New work also became synonymous with a decline in purchasing power. At Levi Strauss, the salary was between 5500 francs and 11.000 francs, depending on how efficient you were. Essel is clear on this point: “Wages were an obstacle to conversion to new work. We offer the jobs available on the market. We can not invent them. We can not get another company to raise wages. For 20 years, the changes have affected a large part of the working population in France, and we are facing mechanisms that slow down wage developments and have a catastrophic impact on total demand. "
Levi Strauss has withdrawn from his responsibility, and operates with the greatest possible secrecy. In May 1998, the President of Levi Strauss visited the factory in France. A few days later he sent this letter: “Above all, I want to thank you for producing one hundred millionth jeans. I wear it with great pride and joy, and it reminds me of the 542 wonderful people in Yser (La Bassée). My best wishes for the future. ” Four months later, the company announced that the factory would be closed. Many of the workers could not digest this. Especially when Levi Strauss had denied that production was to be moved.
Change strategy
In a letter from September 29, 1998, the company writes about overcapacity. In reality, it is completely changing its strategy to follow the same path as its main competitors: focusing on marketing and closing down production, and the use of cheap labor in developing countries through subcontractors. But Levi Strauss wants to keep his reputation. Had not "Bob" Haas received an award from the United Nations in November 1997 for improving conditions for his workers?
Therefore, the company denies: – Our decision is to close the factory, not to move production. We have a single factory in Turkey, from 1988, and have not opened any new ones since then, says Carl von Buskirk, President of Levi Strauss in Europe, the Middle East and Africa. Eight months pass, and on June 3, 1999, the company contradicts itself in a statement published in the Turkish press: “The restructuring of Levi Strauss-USA has benefited Turkey. Turkey has received a large part of the investments that Levis has transferred from other countries. The Denimko factory was opened in April 1997. The goal is to produce 3,7 million trousers in 2000. These are exported to France, England, Germany, Spain, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. ”
The fate of the female French workers is therefore no coincidence. They became victims of the international reorganization of the labor market. When Levi Strauss has acted this way, it is also because the strength of the relationship has in no way hindered it. Media often refer to the experiences at Renault-Vilvorde to prove that social change plans can achieve good results. But the Vilvorde example is very atypical. Behind the good results lay an unusual relationship of strength; a collaboration between trade union leaders on both sides of the border, political indignation and great media coverage.
All of this pushed Renault to take on the responsibility for two years to find new jobs for the unemployed, and to maintain 400 jobs in Vilvorde, Belgium, for the most vulnerable workers.
Did not cooperate
In the conflict at the Levi Strauss plant, Belgian and French trade union leaders never cooperated. Local media covered the conflict well, but it was not visible in national media. The authorities also did not object to the closure of the factory.
When the reactions of politicians and the media do not contract, social change plans fail. And the unsuccessful attempt is underway because neither the local elected officials, the unions nor the business have anything to boast about.
In the spring of 2000, a number of workers at Levi Strauss stated that the politicians had failed. Several mentioned in particular Martine Aubry, then Minister of Labor and Deputy Mayor of Lille. At the end of October 1999, she asked parliament how to close a factory where the workers made the famous jeans for a quarter of what it costs in the shop. " Here she touched on the big problem, but without looking more closely at it.
The authorities have therefore tried to patch the wounds, but no more. On the day the factory closed, several of the workers sent their election cards in icy condition to Martine Aubry. In the county of Nord-Pas-de-Calais, where the left held the position in the municipal elections in 2001, the right-hand side gained over 58 percent in La Bassée.
Translated by Ole-Jacob Christensen. Reproduced with permission of Le Monde Diplomatique.
