(THIS ARTICLE IS MACHINE TRANSLATED by Google from Norwegian)
When the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki destroyed Japan, India was still fighting for its independence. But Indian authorities condemned the bombing and called for the eradication of nuclear weapons. Indian nuclear policy has been in development since then, and has since the country became independent been characterized by both the country's strategic and nuclear political local communities, as well as political dilemmas vis-à-vis the outside world.
Independent India supported the United Nations resolution of 1946, which called for the extinction not only of nuclear weapons, but also of other weapons of mass destruction. The resolution also called for peaceful use of nuclear research and for the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. India has always stood for non-proliferation of nuclear weapons to be linked to disarmament, and has constantly come up with new initiatives and plans in this way. The country participated in creating the non-proliferation agreement signed in 1968, and also proposed a resolution in this regard. The international community chose to adopt the Irish resolution to get the deal in port. India stayed away from this agreement because the authorities thought it was discriminatory against the country's interests in trade, research and security – but continued to promote nuclear disarmament in various contexts, notably the so-called Six-Nation Five Continents nuclear disarmament plan (where Sweden and Greece were two European countries). countries that signed the agreement) as well as Rajiv Gandhi's nuclear disarmament plan, which aimed at a world without nuclear weapons by 2010.
No nuclear disarmament plan took shape. Instead came a postponement of the non-proliferation agreement, a postponement that legitimized nuclear weapons in five countries. India also had security concerns to deal with Chinese nuclear weapons. They also stayed away from the conclusions of the 1966 probation agreement, which had no clear nuclear disarmament plan, nor was it as comprehensive as first claimed.
Idealism and realism. India was in a situation where five countries had nuclear weapons and constantly built up larger stocks, and where a network of countries like Pakistan and North Korea were involved in the shady development of nuclear weapons. In practice, most of it was about keeping superfluous nuclear weapons, not nuclear disarmament. In 1998, India conducted a nuclear test, even though it supported global nuclear disarmament – a good example of how it has balanced idealism and realism in its nuclear policy.
After the tests were completed, India realized that they had an increased responsibility to ensure that nuclear research and technology did not fall into the wrong hands, and gradually became a more active participant in several of the non-proliferation initiatives. Among other things, India participated in the processes around all the four nuclear safety conferences and increased its involvement in export control and multilateral export control systems.
India's promises of answers. Some European countries worry about nuclear war between India and Pakistan. How realistic is that? And how does India relate to Pakistan's nuclear policy? Pakistan does not want to use strategic or tactical weapons – but also does not want to remain calm. What could lead to a real danger of nuclear war between the two countries?
In recent years, Pakistan has increasingly shown believers to use nuclear weapons in a war situation. The defeat of Kargil has taught the country nothing. In a war situation, Pakistan is likely to come up with nuclear weapons threats. The country has previously used this strategy to prevent India from acting after Pakistan-sponsored terrorism has taken place in various Indian cities.
International reactions are a driving force that will prevent Pakistan from using any form of nuclear weapons. The world does not need nuclear weapons after Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Even the United States has not used nuclear weapons in a war in which they have not faced a defense. Building a strong standard against nuclear weapons can put enormous pressure on Pakistan. The country will be completely isolated from the international community.
But another driving force preventing Pakistan from using nuclear weapons is India's policy and second strikedoctrine. Although India, like Pakistan, has not gone beyond the size of its own nuclear weapons stockpile, information on deliveries is publicly available. It gives us a sufficient idea of India's ability to harm Pakistan should the latter use nuclear weapons. India's official nuclear doctrine reads as follows: "India's response to a first attack will be massive and it intends to cause irreparable harm." Pakistan undoubtedly understands India's language use and willingness to strike back.
Believe in disarmament. India is opposed to regionalization of the nuclear weapons challenges. Pakistan is not the country's target. In fact, China is the main reason why India initially acquired nuclear weapons – but the Indian nuclear doctrine is not country specific. India's nuclear doctrine is to not use nuclear weapons first, and to not use it against countries that themselves do not have nuclear weapons. India believes in strong leadership and control where the nuclear buttons are available to the country's top political leadership.
"India's response to a first attack will be massive and it intends to cause irreparable harm." – India's official nuclear doctrine.
India believes in being safer in a world without nuclear weapons, and has a strong belief in balancing interests, approaches and values against each other: idealism / realism, non-proliferation / disarmament, as well as national / international security interests. The country is well on its way to becoming an important partner in non-proliferation efforts, and also in the fight against destabilizing forces. They also know that global nuclear disarmament is absolutely necessary to ensure lasting world peace.
See interview og book-criticism on this topic.
Nayan recently visited PRIO in Oslo. He is a researcher at the Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis, New Delhi
rajivnayan@hotmail.com
