China's soft – and less soft – power in Southeast Asia

When Philippine history professor Maria Serena I. Diokno was invited last summer as a keynote speaker in a panel on authoritarian trends in Southeast Asia at the International Conference of Asia Scholars in Chiang Mai, Thailand, she gave an inspired and indignant speech on historical revisionism and strategic oblivion during the sitting Philippine Duterte government. One of President Rodrigo Duterte's main actions has been to forge close and almost unconditional ties to China, a country that the Philippines has otherwise had a strained relationship with for decades – not least because of the sea-territorial conflict between the two countries. Duterte has gone so far as to disregard an international ruling by 2016 granting the Philippines the dispute.

Therefore, it is also somewhat disappointing that the new anthology China's Footprints in Southeast Asia, of which Diokno is co-editor, only marginally touches on China's increasing economic and political influence in the Philippines in recent years.

According to critics, President Duterte has decided to sell the Philippines to China.

The anthology's contribution covers most Southeast Asian countries with momentary historical scratches, while the primary focus is on the period from the 1990s to the 2010s. However, as far as the Philippines is concerned, the analysis is limited to the time of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (2001-2010), where several large Chinese-funded projects were littered due to extensive corruption scandals. That gives a skewed impression of China's footprint in this particular country, as current President Duterte – who has also withdrawn Macapagal-Arroyo into the political heat – has, according to critics, decided to sell the Philippines to China.

The strategy behind the Confucius institutes

China's Footprints in Southeast Asia is based on Joseph Nye's famous theory of 'soft power' – a theory that Chinese academics and the top of the Communist Party read with great interest and incorporated as a form of ideological clue in developing China's foreign policy aspirations.

One of the tools explored in the anthology is the Confucius institutes, which in the United States, Canada and several European countries – including Norway – are controversial, but enjoy the high support of the local elite in most Southeast Asian countries. Among other things, the Norwegian discussion has focused on whether the Confucius institutes, financed and politically controlled by the Chinese state, are being used as a tool to promote Chinese interests and worldviews at the expense of freedom of research.

Although there is a difference in how these institutes function locally, depending on the national context and the context of the individual host universities, there is much evidence that China – not surprisingly – is just using the institutes strategically and for more than just spreading knowledge of Chinese language and ' culture'.

The first Confucius Institute (CI), according to the anthology, was established in Seoul, South Korea in 2004. Since then, they spread like a wildfire worldwide, and in 2016 there were more than 500 Confucius institutes and 1000 so-called Confucius Classrooms (CC) – language institutes set up in colleges and elementary schools – distributed in 134 countries. Although most CIs and CCs are set up at host institutions in North and South America, Asia is central to this particular part of China's soft-power strategy, the anthology claims, because: "First, unlike in the US or Europe, there has been minimal opposition to CIs and CCs in Asia. Second, most of China's Asian neighbors welcome the connection to China because the countries benefit from China's economic ascent. ”

Friends of China

Unfortunately, the anthology, which is socially scientifically and in this sense macro-data oriented, does not go into depth about exactly what these CIs and CCs have done in Asia and how they might affect the research content of the host institutions and the political agenda in the host countries. Otherwise, it would have been relevant knowledge for the discussion about the legitimacy / risk of these institutions in the Nordic countries. Locals in China's neighboring countries are beginning to oppose the mega projects that often benefit China's elite and local elites a lot more than they benefit people most.

Locals in China's neighboring countries are beginning to resist the mega projects that often benefit China's elite and local elites a great deal more than they benefit most people.

It is interesting, however, with the overview given by the massive support of the local elites in particular Thailand, Singapore and Cambodia for the establishment of Confucius institutes in the respective countries. In Thailand – where Confucius institutes have been set up at two of the most recognized research institutions, Chulalongkorn University and Chiang Mai University – Princess Sirindhorn herself became the mascot of China's soft power in the country, and in 2010, China named her one of her ten best friends abroad.

Bid our time

The editors' introduction shows the development from mutual skepticism and mistrust between the People's Republic of China and the non / anti-communist ASEAN countries until the economic crisis of 1997 – and China's market reform strategy – brought them together. At the same time, they point to possible new tensions as the soft power China claims to exercise in all its friendliness in its neighboring countries turns out to be less soft, and as locals begin to resist the mega projects that often benefit China's elite and the local elites a great deal more than they benefit most people.

Among the other most interesting contributions is Then-Chi Chang's historical scratch on China's foreign policy strategy from Deng Xiaoping's hide our light and bide our time-parole to Xi Jinping's far more confrontational and expansive approach to neighboring countries.

China's Footprints in Southeast Asia is in several places equally legitimate study compendium-like and Joseph Nye repetitive, as well as missing key current elements such as President Duterte's unilateral opening of the Philippines for China's investments as well as a more in-depth analysis of the implications of the Belt and Road initiative. Nonetheless, it provides a useful overview of China's maneuvers in a region that is becoming increasingly culturally, economically and politically central to world order.