(THIS ARTICLE IS MACHINE TRANSLATED by Google from Norwegian)
Natopolitanism: The Atlantic Alliance since the Cold War is a collection of essays by authors ranging from the historian John Lewis Gaddis and international relations scholar John Mearsheimer to the French philosopher Régis Debray. The book is edited by the American historian Gray Anderson. He wants to be extremely clear right from the start: "Military alliances, by definition, are an agreement on the use of force against a rival. But this is not their only, or even primary, role. […] They may also serve as pacta de contrahendo, through which a strong power controls weaker allies, potential adversaries seek conciliation, or contracting parties pledge mutual restraint. Since its inception in 1949, NATO has assumed all of these functions.” In short, in a military alliance there will always be someone who is "more equal than the others".
Soviet Union
The Soviet Union was far from the West, and a Soviet invasion of Western Europe therefore remained a rather distant prospect throughout the Cold War. The NATO alliance could therefore concentrate on the potentially subversive internal enemies, based on named 'universal' and therefore indisputable values such as freedom, democracy and so on. Admittedly, the democratic credibility of an alliance which, among other things, had the Portuguese dictatorship Estado Novo and the colonial power France among its founders, could seem a bit without substance. But in the face of the terrifying threat from communism, one could hardly afford to be too picky. In politics, you often have to settle for allies who are not quite ideal.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, many wondered what purpose NATO would serve.
After of the Soviet Union collapse, there were many – too many according to some, too few according to others – who wondered what purpose NATO was supposed to serve. Some even advocated splitting it up. But this kind of thinking is naive and shows a fundamental lack of understanding of the true nature of the Atlantic 'alliance'. In the 1950s, NATO's first Secretary General, Lord Hastings Lionel Ismay, could honestly define NATO's mission as "keeping the Soviet Union out, the Americans in and the Germans down." But these are not the kinds of historical revelations that even the most well-informed citizens can hope to find today—if they stick to reading the respectable press or watching the news on television.
Humbled and impoverished
Some of the essays in this volume are not exactly new. But even the most outdated are still startlingly relevant. It has now become a cliché that is repeated to the point of boredom to claim that the Russian aggression against Ukraine was "unprovoked". Russia allegedly invaded Ukraine simply because Russia and Putin, due to his deeply malignant nature, has an innate hatred of democracy.
But as illustrated several times in this volume, researchers, historians and experts in international relations already expressed deep concern about the pressure in the 1990s. One did not need to be a soothsayer to realize that an expansion of NATO would cause problems, since Russia would feel threatened by it, regardless of who was at the helm of the country. As the historian Gaddis points out, the Soviet Union under Gorbachev had voluntarily refrained from confrontation with the West. Instead of showing magnanimity to an opponent who no longer wanted to be an enemy, continued USA excluding Russia and rejected any idea of a common European security architecture as an illusion ('chimera'). Russia had emerged from the Cold War humiliated and impoverished, and the weak must suffer what they must, it seemed to think in Washington.
NATO Secretary General
That the war in Ukraine may have something to do with NATO is a truth that is too uncomfortable for our time. Russia has often talked about a "promise" from the US not to expand NATO as a condition for Germanys collection. According to Russia, this promise was broken. The West says that such a promise simply never existed, something that has been rabidly insisted on in a number of editorials in recent years. Russia, being Russia, could not help but lie. But as historian Mary Elise Sarotte shows, the "pledge" not to expand NATO was not just a figment of tireless Russian propaganda, but rather the result of a fatal misunderstanding and naivety on the part of Russia and incredible opportunism on the part of the United States.
The "promise" not to expand NATO was not just a figment of tireless Russian propaganda
That there is at least a strong connection between the war in Ukraine and the NATO issue was suggested by none other than NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, albeit perhaps in a somewhat clumsy way. Speaking last year about a treaty Russia had offered in 2021 to "stop NATO expansion", Stoltenberg proudly and belligerently declared: "Of course we didn't sign it." Could a less uncompromising stance have prevented the war? But here you miss the point. The war in Ukraine was a godsend for NATO.
As recently as 2019, French President Emmanuel Macron called it "brain death". Today, no one would dare to say such things in public, unless they wanted to be branded puppets of the Kremlin, just like those who protested against NATO in the 1960s.
Translated from English by the editor.
