(THIS ARTICLE IS MACHINE TRANSLATED by Google from Norwegian)
Orientering June 15
Initially, the defense plan states that "the goal of Norwegian security policy in short is to secure our own peace and freedom and at the same time do what we can to contribute to peaceful development in the rest of the world". Nor can this objective be realized as a member of NATO. Membership undermines our freedom in the sense of democratic decision-making. The lack of truthful and sufficient information on the mutual obligations established by the NATO Treaty and integration weakens the basis for wise action in a democracy. A well-informed opinion is a prerequisite for democratic decisions.
The defense plan announces increased military activity, greater integration with NATO forces, control, warning and communications systems and NATO deployment of military facilities in Norway – as a satellite communications station in southern Norway. These measures are not in the interest of Norway and the Nordic security policy, but constitute provocative bombing targets and increase the tension on the Northern Calotte.
The defense plan's stated goal of "contributing to peaceful development in the rest of the world" is inconsistent with the plan's premise that our neighbor the Soviet Union poses a threat to Norway and that only NATO can avert this threat. Despite historical facts, psychological defense preparedness is set to a mental one
arming of Norwegian opinion aimed at the "enemy" – "the attacker" – "the great power" accused of having strategic need for Norwegian territory. This assessment of our neighbor's intentions and goals is captured in NATO's staffs and commands, where military planning for 19 years has been directed at the common, designated "enemy." Regardless of the neighborly relations that have always prevailed between Norway and the great power in the east, the government follows NATO's assessments.
It cannot be accepted that our membership, as well as NATO's activities on Norwegian territory, are presented as necessary measures solely for the purpose of "helping us". Through Article V of the Pact and the agreements, commitments and arrangements that the integration process in NATO has brought with it, Norway is – in a way that is quite binding – obliged to possibly go to war. This means a rather strong restriction of our right of disposal. When it is stated in the defense plan that "our military defense is designed to fight in our own country", it says that the fulfillment of Norway's obligation to possibly go to war will entail the use of Norwegian territory. Herein lies the strategic importance of our area as NATO's northern flank. Developments within NATO have led to a military-strategic utilization of our territory which makes the nuclear and base declarations made completely illusory. The intimate integration has greater value in the larger NATO perspective than a stationing of thousands of Allied soldiers in Norway would have had. It is impermissible when the reports fail to assess the significance for NATO's advanced strategy that US submarines with Polaris missiles, some of which have been transferred to European command already in peacetime, operate in the immediate vicinity of Norwegian and Soviet territory. NATO's and the United States' naval integration and strategy have determined the nature and scope of the jointly funded facilities in Norway – facilities that utilize the strategic opportunities both geographically and topographically. According to NATO-LETTER, naval installations, submarine stations and mine depots, NATO war headquarters, communications facilities, hangars and ammunition depots have been blasted into Norwegian mountains. It is inadmissible to disregard the fact that Norwegian territory, through NATO facilities and in combination with a common command system and strategy, will become a battlefield in the event of war. These conditions are unknown to Norwegian opinion, and thus deprived of the people's democratic control.
The member states' national defenses are adapted to the common strategy. This is based on NATO's decision on an advance in strategy and with the use of nuclear weapons. No reservation has been made that NATO's strategy will not apply to our part of the NATO area. With reference to Report No. 28 / 60-61 to the Storting, the Government's report on NATO co-operation states that "both the committee recommendations and the debate in the Storting showed that there was broad agreement on the general guidelines on which Norwegian nuclear policy should rest". It has turned out that these guidelines are not in accordance with the popular demand in the spring of 1961 for an unconditional no to the use of nuclear weapons in Norway. It is a fact that the popular movement against nuclear weapons led by "The 13" did not reach its goals. The real content of the government's declaration on nuclear weapons in 1961 was shown in the tactical directives for the army, 1961. They contained, and contain, directives for the use of nuclear weapons in the Norwegian defense. It appears from «Norwegian Military Journal (1/62) where the directives are discussed: We know that an attacker may have tactical nuclear weapons at his disposal. But we do not know if he will use them. We must therefore be prepared for both a conventional and a nuclear war. Every chief operating officer should consider this when choosing his solution
assignment. And the choice will be what risk he in the present situation will accept in one direction or another. We must thus be able to wage the dispute with and without these means. This places great demands on our adaptation. "
According to NATO-LETTER, naval installations, submarine stations and mine depots, NATO war headquarters, communications facilities, hangars and ammunition depots have been blasted into Norwegian mountains.
In the aforementioned report to the Storting (28/60), the military authorities' views on nuclear weapons are as follows: “Consideration for one's own civilian population will always be a limiting factor when nuclear weapons are to be used in one's own territory. In terms of population, however, our country is better off in this area than most NATO countries. Norway is one of the most sparsely populated countries in Europe. In vulnerable parts of the country there are areas that are unpopulated, in other areas the population density is generally so small that it does not raise insurmountable evacuation problems. With regard to high air explosions for aviation purposes, this is not considered to pose a particular risk to the civilian population. In terms of security, the best solution will of course be for the weapons to be used against the enemy before he sets foot on Norwegian soil. Thus, if an invasion fleet can be hit with nuclear weapons while it is still in space at sea, this will also be a definite advantage operationally for safety reasons. An effective tactical use of nuclear weapons in one's own defense therefore necessitates an intimate and coordinated co-operation between the Civil Defense and the military defense. "
During the military exercise "Barbara VIl" on the Bodø peninsula in June last year, the "Orange attack forces that had entrenched themselves at the LK building outside Bodø were blown up by a 20-kilo ton bomb of Hiroshima format", according to a report in Nordlands Future. Exercises of this kind – training in the use of nuclear weapons – are based on the artfully formulated government declaration on nuclear weapons from 1961. But such exercises are contrary to the information provided in and outside the Storting. Even after Norwegian defense ministers in the Storting have denied that nuclear weapons are used or have been used by us, there have been nuclear exercises in the Norwegian defense, where nuclear weapons are placed at 10, 20, 50, 100 kilotons over Rygge, Torp, Bardufoss, Sola – after which you chase the enemy at sea.
The then Minister of Defense claimed in the Storting on 13 June 1963 that training in the use of nuclear weapons did not take place in the Norwegian defense. In February 1964, he informed the Storting
presidency that the tactical directives of 1961 "in this context" had been amended.
The Minister of Defense had no cover for his presentation on exercises with nuclear weapons, neither in 1963 nor in 1964. It should call for serious consideration that a Minister of Defense can provide misleading information about the use of nuclear weapons without the NATO parties' representatives in the Storting reacting.
The nuclear debate in the Storting on 13 June 1963 was prompted by an open letter from the Campaign Against Nuclear Weapons to «every single citizen in our country, the political parties, the press and our Storting, to take a conscientious consideration of whether it really finds itself, our country and a peaceful development of the relationship between the warring power blocs served by a Norwegian defense contingency that includes preparations for the use of nuclear weapons ».
This five-year-old appeal is highly topical, and still unanswered.
The democracy that NATO membership is claimed to protect is undermined by the political immorality that membership has developed. NATO therefore represents an internal threat to freedom and democracy in the sense of national independence and democratic decision-making processes. The Storting's consideration in 1961 of the question of the introduction of nuclear weapons in the Armed Forces and the forthcoming consideration of continued membership in NATO beyond 1969, coupled with rolling long-term planning following decisions by NATO bodies, confirms that continued membership in NATO is not in the Norwegian people's interest.
A review of the two reports to the Storting can only lead to the conclusion that Norway's membership in NATO must end, so that our country can once again work independently and independently for disarmament, peace and international law.
