Secret meeting: The United States pushed Norway into war participation

A cloudy morning 20. September 2007 gathered six ambassadors from the US, Afghanistan and a bunch of central NATO countries for a breakfast meeting in Oslo, organized by the British Embassy. While a light breeze made the cold outside a little colder, the diplomats sat down to discuss a war that ravaged 5000 kilometers southeast of the Norwegian capital – in Afghanistan.

Afghanistan is an underdeveloped and resource-poor, but strategically important mountain country that various great powers have sought to gain control over centuries, largely without success. Russian, Arab, Mongolian, British and Soviet military forces have tried in turn, usually with tragic outcome. In 1842, 16 500 British, both soldiers and civilians, were massacred during the withdrawal from Kabul, and many believe that a major cause of the Soviet Union's collapse was the strain the Afghanistan occupation had inflicted on the Communist state.

Norway not a guest. The Ambassador's meeting in Oslo was part of a larger international effort for the United States and NATO to achieve what no major powers had previously done: tame the Afghan resistance. This time it was about drawing more NATO countries deeper into the war against the Taliban regime, and the goal of the Oslo meeting was to get Norway to contribute greater economic and military resources, or, like the then US Ambassador Benson Kelley Whitney described it in the subsequent meeting's report: "Getting Norway to do more in Afghanistan".

Whitney's report was sent to Washington and the US Embassy in Kabul a few days after the rally. "20. In September, local Danish, Dutch, Afghan and Canadian ambassadors attended a key alliance breakfast in Afghanistan hosted by Britain's Ambassador David Powell. The breakfast covered ways to ensure renewal (and hopefully expansion) of Norway's NATO commitments, especially with the Operational Mentor and Liaison Team and special forces contributions. The ambassador concluded that a Norwegian telemark battalion contribution was unlikely. In line with what the [US] embassy has long advocated, the ambassadors agreed to encourage ways to gather support for the Afghanistan [war] in Norwegian opinion, including a conference organized by a Norwegian NGO, "the United States writes ambassador.

The United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Denmark and Afghanistan were invited – but not Norway, despite the fact that Norway's role in the war was to be thematized.

The catastrophic developments in both Iraq and Afghanistan had made it more difficult for the United States to gain support for continued warfare among its allies. The United States' closest partner in NATO, United Kingdom, therefore called together the ambassadors to discuss how Norway could be influenced to contribute more in the war. But only representatives from the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Denmark and Afghanistan were invited – the host country itself was not on the guest list, despite, or perhaps because of, it was Norway's role in the war to be thematized.

Over the phone from the UK, former British Ambassador Powell confirms that the meeting took place: "I remember we had an informal meeting at the Embassy about Norway's role in Afghanistan. It is quite normal for diplomats to meet to talk about the host country. In this case, one of the themes was how to get Norway to contribute more in Afghanistan. "

Disinformation. Three months later, on December 18, 2007, US Ambassador Whitney wrote a new document on Norway's Afghanistan contribution. This was confidential and addressed to the CIA, the military intelligence service DIA, the US NATO Representation as well as the Department of Defense and Foreign Affairs and some US embassies in Europe. Here, the ambassador goes a long way to explain that the reason why around half of Norway's population still supports the war participation in Afghanistan is that the government is secretly on the verge of disinformation about the situation in the war-torn country:

"Public support for Norwegian deployment in Afghanistan is about 50 percent, but in large sections of society, and clearly in the SV, there is a strong belief that military power creates rather than solves problems, and that military should only be used for peacekeeping. mission with UN mandate. This view is especially prevalent among younger Norwegians who have no direct memories of US support during the Cold War and World War II. This has meant that GON [the Norwegian government] is silent about Afghanistan, or merely emphasizes the development side and implies that there are others who use force, while Norway is doing reconstruction. ”

At this time, the government still refused to use the word "war" about what was going on in Afghanistan, and talked about "stabilization missions". This despite the fact that Norwegian soldiers themselves expressed that they were involved in war actions, including in Faryab province northwest of the country. "We are waging war in Afghanistan," Colonel Terje Hanssen, for example, said in an interview with VG on September 8, 2009.

Support on a false basis. On March 5, 2008, US Ambassador Whitney reiterates in yet another confidential document to the CIA and DIA that Norwegians are being fed a humanitarian image of the war, so inconsistent with the reality that public opinion can quickly turn around if this image were to crack:

"Despite strong opposition to the [war in] Afghanistan from the left, people's support for Norwegian participation in Afghanistan has remained stable at 50-60 percent. But the level of this support should not be exaggerated as it is justified, first and foremost on the basis that Norway's participation is focused on peacekeeping and humanitarian aid. "

Whitney was by no means alone in seeing the situation this way. On November 25, 2009, Barry B. White, who had then taken over Whitney's ambassador position, wrote a secret-stamped document referring to a conversation with the then Secretary of State in the Department of Defense, later Defense Minister Espen Barth Eide:

"However, he [Barth Eide] warned the US to openly make demands on Norway, such as asking for Norway to send the Telemark battalion to the south [in Afghanistan], as this would provoke political debate in Norway and undermine the 'solid foundation' that the current government has built to ensure continued support for Afghanistan efforts. "

Impact via third parties. In line with the US approach in other countries, the documents suggest that getting relevant NGOs and the media to front the campaign for continued Norwegian war participation was an important part of the Americans' Norwegian strategy. In the minutes of the British-initiated breakfast meeting, Ambassador Whitney writes that "[the American] ambassador also plans to gather support from and involve NGOs, commentators and the media" [MODERN TIMES has a copy of all Wikileaks quotes]. Such a method is far from the United States alone to use, but the country succeeds better than anyone else due to its large financial muscle, long experience and closer global networks with ties and access to media and NGOs than the rest of the world's states.

Which Norwegian NGOs the American diplomats worked with does not emerge from the leaked documents. The British ex-ambassador Powell says the following to Ny Tid: "There may have been talk of obtaining support from Norwegian NGOs, but I do not remember the details of this. I think there was talk of progress for women's rights in Afghanistan, which was relevant as gender equality was part of the Norwegian Afghanistan agenda.

The SV government had good opportunities to stop the dispatch of special forces to both Afghanistan and the disastrous Libya war.

Two years after the ambassador's meeting, Gry Larsen, then acting foreign minister in Jonas Gahr Støre's absence, could, according to the new ambassador White, state that the Norwegian war participation had the support of "… Norwegian NGOs operating in Afghanistan" – even this time without stating which organizations.

The US's desire to keep its influence campaign in Norway hidden, led the Americans to get relief from Afghanistan's Norwegian ambassador Javid Lodin. Although many Afghans at that time considered then-President Hamid Karzai an instrument for the intervention forces, Whitney obviously believed that Norwegians would trust the "progress" in Afghanistan if the message came from the Afghan ambassador. At the closed diplomatic meeting in autumn 2007, Lodin presented a number of arguments for increased Norwegian support for the war:

"For example, he said that due to US support, Afghanistan is becoming self-sufficient in grain production. In addition, the country's high child mortality rate has risen by 30 percent […] Afghan President [Karzai] was optimistic about an improved security situation. The recent there is a loya [meeting with tribal leaders and political, religious and military participants] and increasing terrorist attacks in Pakistan led to increased cooperation between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Lodin pointed out that the long-awaited Taliban naval offensive never recovered, and that many high-ranking Taliban leaders have been killed. Even if the management was neglected in the past, Lodin said, a new directorate under Karzai's direct management will have a positive impact on security ... »

Much of what the Afghan ambassador said was only partially true to reality. Grain production increased significantly, but not enough for Afghanistan to become self-sufficient – not in 2007, nor in 2017. Child mortality had probably also decreased, but according to the Washington Post, both the UN and the CIA have operated with child mortality rates 50 to 100 percent higher than those presented by the Afghan government (taken from US-sponsored surveys). Already the year before, a Norwegian ISAF colonel had told NTB that "the Taliban is fighting in south [Afghanistan]". But while this time, in line with the NATO ambassador's PR strategy towards Norway, was the ambassador to Afghanistan who conveyed the message, it has since become clear that the story of the alleged military progress did not match reality.

Norway as a state of war. The documents show that in the autumn of 2007, the United States wanted Norway to send the Telemark battalion again to Afghanistan. Of the diplomats present, however, several questioned whether this was desirable as well as realistic. Several felt that the battalion would not make a significant military difference, despite its status as a very capable and professional unit, having been deployed for only six months. On the other hand, it appeared that the US, NATO allies and the Karzai government wanted a Norwegian presence in Afghanistan for a completely different reason:

"Several ambassadors also noted that even though it was sent, the Telemark battalion had such short stays (six months) that its utility would be limited to a symbolic role. The importance of Norway as a 'tilting country' in defense matters was also noted. Despite its modest size – when Norway participates in security actions, other countries are encouraged to join and find it useful. The Dutch ambassador said that what Norway does militarily is 'crucial'. ”

The term "rocking state" is best known from presidential elections in the United States, about states that can determine the outcome of the election. The ambassadors of the British embassy thus identified Norway as the European tilting state for NATO allies' war participation, with a decisive influence on whether the other NATO countries join when the United States goes to war. The analysis is from 2007 and not necessarily identical to the view of the US Department of Foreign Affairs and Defense. But it does shed new light on Norway's role in later conflicts, such as the bombing of Libya and the Western intervention in Syria.

In the document, Whitney relays the Dutch Ambassador's description of how dragging Norway deeper into the Afghanistan war could have a positive impact on Dutch opinion:

"The Dutch ambassador, Ronald van Roeden, described how the Netherlands would soon decide what happens when its mandate [to participate in the Afghanistan war] ends in August 2008. He noted that the public opinion had fallen after the Dutch defeat and that the Dutch were very worried about the drug situation. The Dutch emphasized the need for a third partner in Afghanistan and continue to look towards Norway. ”

US feared SV. On June 9, 2006, US diplomat Graham Webster and two senior officials in the Department of Foreign Affairs and Defense met in secret. The persuasion campaign against the government to send more Norwegian special forces to NATO's International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) forces in Afghanistan was the theme. Webster's meeting report was classified as "Secret noforn": secret, and forbidden to refer to foreigners (as there are many at US embassies). It was sent to several of America's most important military units, the country's NATO representation and the Department of Defense and Foreign Affairs. The two contacts in our own Department of Defense are named, but the document instructs recipients to protect their identity. This may indicate that the contact was in violation of the Norwegian Ministry of Defense rules for meetings with foreign government representatives. There is no indication that the two Norwegians acted as United States agents, but they have informed the United States ambassador of the views of the Norwegian government on the question of Norwegian special forces in Afghanistan. In the document, Webster uses the American term "ends in succession" about those in the government who will meet the United States' desire for special forces. The two Norwegian contacts clearly state that the United States cannot expect to get it the way they want. Webster suggests attempting to "bully" government partner SV to fulfill US desire:

"According to MOD [the Norwegian Ministry of Defense], one of the ends that had already stood in line was Foreign Minister Jonas Støre. The real challenge of Strøm Erichsen [sic] and Støre's combined weight will come from junior government partners / peace supporters / Afghanistan skeptics in the Socialist Left Party (SV). Norway's current Afghanistan deployment is bitter pills to swallow for SV, and supporting ISAF with SOF [Special Operations Forces] may be too much for SV. One of Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg's main goals has been to keep his government coalition together. If the SV cannot be bullied into agreeing to the SOF deployment to ISAF, Stoltenberg will not let its coalition fall apart to support the plans of its defense and foreign ministers to implement the deployment. "

"According to the Norwegian Ministry of Defense, one of the ends that had already stood in line was Foreign Minister Jonas Støre."

The SV's peace engagement is described by the word "peacenik", invented during the Cold War, in which the Russian-sounding "nod" was to point out that the peace fighters were actually in the enemy – at that time Soviet – service. Equally interesting, it is perhaps that the Norwegian informants thought Stoltenberg would give in if the SV tried hard against hard to prevent the deployment of Norwegian special forces. Webster's considerations may indicate that the SV had good opportunities to stop special forces shipments to both Afghanistan and the disastrous Libya war, if the party's government members and party leaders had agreed.

Webster ends the secret-stamped document with a request to his superiors in Washington: "If our decision-making for Norwegian SOF deployment to ISAF becomes public, we can guarantee that [deployment] will not happen. This must be seen as a Norwegian initiative. ”

Former Ambassador Powell does not rule out that the campaign to influence Norway succeeded: "Well, Norway listens to its friends and allies, and the country actually increased its presence in Afghanistan."

Background:

See "It's true that I warned," says Barth Eide