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Disc boom in the Sandberg case 

Per Sandberg did not need to go to Iran to be monitored. New monitoring techniques make it possible to locate mobile users – regardless of where they are. We take a closer look at these developments.

(THIS ARTICLE IS ONLY MACHINE TRANSLATED by Google from Norwegian)

After Per Sandberg returned from his infamous holiday trip to Iran, surveillance of smartphones in public service has been updated in Norwegian media. The question many people ask is whether Sandberg could have avoided surveillance if he had not brought the work phone to Iran. 

But what is the potential for national and international security services, hackers and webspeakers with today's new surveillance techniques? And what surveillance traps should politicians and other public opinion makers guard against?  

Silent SMS 

Already in 2012, Sandberg's mobile phone was located and eavesdropped by Dagens Næringsliv using a location method for mobile phones called a "silent SMS" [silent text message].

In Germany this wiretapping method is very widespread. The mobile phone is first located over the telecommunications network, and then the hacker sends a silent SMS to the mobile phone to be tracked. When the phone receives  The SMS, it triggers a feedback from the phone to the phone. . .

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Hans-Georg Kohler
Kohler is a regular reviewer for Ny Tid. Artist.

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