(THIS ARTICLE IS MACHINE TRANSLATED by Google from Norwegian)
One of the book Bioweapons: The Road to Armageddon One of the most striking historical examples of biological weapons in warfare is an attack the Japanese planned on California in 1945. Submarines would bring with them planes with folding wings, which would be launched by catapults, sail in over Los Angeles, San Diego and San Francisco and release myriads of plague-infected fleas infected before the kamikaze pilots crashed their planes into strategic targets. Operation Cherry Blossoms at Night was hatched by the unscrupulous Ishii Shiro, the leader of Unit 732 in Manchuria during World War II. With 3000 employees, this was the most extensive bioweapons facility in history. It was where human experimentation was carried out on a large scale, and tons of deadly bacteria were produced – including cholera, typhoid, anthrax and plague.
Shockingly, the research extends into our own time, despite international treaties banning the use of biological weapons.
The story of the ambitious and unscrupulous Shiro Ishii is a key passage in Frøland's review of the fascinating and sinister history of bioweapons. After Japan's capitulation, the facility was searched by Soviet forces and is believed to have inspired 'biopreparat', the Soviet Union's infamous bioweapons program. Although Ishii's actions were on a par with those of the very worst Nazi officers, he was never convicted, because he was extradited to the United States, which feared the Russians' bioweapons and wanted help in developing a similar program, for both offense and defense. The fact that Ishii was granted amnesty was long kept secret, and information about all his unimaginable abuses was also suppressed. The fact that such a historical chapter has remained so unknown is in itself a strong reason to emphasize the relevance of this book.
What are bioweapons?
The title of Stig Frøland's book Bioweapons: The Road to Armageddon may at first glance seem sensationalistic and alarmist. The book could also appear as reading for those with special interests – or readers who are more anxious than average. It is all the more important that a well-respected researcher and skilled communicator like Frøland takes on the topic.
With his broad experience, cultural knowledge and professional understanding, the medical professor conveys the seriousness of the situation. And despite the colorful and fascinating historical material, the book also remains sober and informative. The introduction is clear and to the point: What are bioweapons? Deadly viruses, bacteria and fungal spores. What properties should a bioweapons ha? Good death microbes should have high mortality, preferably be paralyzing, have a high infectiousness, be easy to produce and suitable for creating fear. If we also lack immunity and medicines for the suffering it brings, that is also a clear advantage. How can the bioweapon be spread? As airborne particles or aerosols, via drinking water – or if the deadly cooperation of nature is advanced enough, perhaps also via insects – as in the example from Japan.
Weapons technology
Interest in biological weapons has historically been unevenly distributed, but it almost inevitably emerges among the major geopolitical players. Hitler was strongly opposed to biological weapons for unclear reasons, but there was still extensive, if unsystematic, research into bioweapons in the Third Reich. But France and Britain also researched infectious agents as a possible weapons technology – both before and after World War II – and the United States has had its own bioweapons facilities, such as Fort Detrick. Other countries that have worked on bioweapons are South Africa during the apartheid period under the racist 'Dr. Death' Wuther Low, as well as presumably Israel and North Korea. But leading world powers are also researching bioweapons, and shockingly, this research extends into our own time, despite international treaties banning the use of biological weapons.
None of the drone attacks were particularly successful, but the will and desire to cause harm was real.
A pattern that keeps repeating itself is that the threat of bioweapons leads to research to defend against bioweapons. The result is knowledge that can still be used offensively. The diabolical logic, as we know from nuclear arms race, is where the enemy can invent something, so we have to invent it first – which escalates the risk. And this research is also close to the normal, civilian research of epidemiology and virology. Scientists who should really have sounded the alarm and protested can be lured by generous budgets and well-equipped laboratoriesFrøland's expertise in medical research and practice gives authority to analyses of this type, which could otherwise appear speculative.
Covid-19 and a possible lab leak
Frøland's book is above all intended as a warning. “[T]he lack of interest in the threat from bioweapons is not only incomprehensible – it is also dangerous. Today we must recognize that a number of states undoubtedly have bioweapons programs of varying scope,” he writes. Secrecy and official denials are part of the logic of bioweapons. Also non-offensive virus research can be done in semi-secret. Even the sincere search for knowledge by scientists can become dangerous, even if they have the best intentions – because who knows what military actors might seize upon?
China has reported that its army laboratories have manipulated others coronaA virus that has had a 100 percent mortality rate when tested on mice.
Such gray areas lie behind Frøland's view of Covid-19 and a possible lab leak in Wuhan. He points out, for example, that China has actually reported that army laboratories have manipulated other coronavirus that has been shown to be 100 percent lethal when tested on mice. He considers it unlikely – but still far from inconceivable – that Covid-19 may have been a manipulated virus and part of a Chinese bioweapons program. In any case, Covid-19 may well have been leaked from the laboratory. Frøland points out that both the Chinese and the American scientific community had their reasons for rejecting a possible lab leak. In the period 2009–2015, a total of 749 laboratory accidents were reported while working with dangerous microbes at US government laboratories, despite strict safety requirements. What are these figures in China? Or worldwide?
Just as dangerous as lab leaks is the “leakage” of scientific results – dangerous knowledge about dangerous microbes – that can fall into the wrong hands. The basic values of science dictate that research should be open. Frøland refers to an experiment in which artificial intelligence was used to find new chemical toxins and in a few hours could list 40 substances. Can something similar be done with viruses and bacteria?
Today, it is much easier than before to equip hobbyist laboratories – and the combination of synthetic biology, aided by genetic engineering software and “biohacking” networks, opens up a dizzying range of dangerous possibilities. biohacking-enthusiasts like Drew Endy have, when it comes to bioterror, insisted that it would be safer if "everyone had access to everything", but in our time we simply cannot select to limit knowledge. Frøland says that ChatGPT can easily provide information about several current pandemic microbes and how to obtain the necessary genetic material to produce them undetected. This knowledge is not even leaked from research, but is itself "synthesized" biological terrorism knowledge.
Failed bioterrorists
With better knowledge, terror will become far more dangerous. Frøland tells of a long line of eco-terrorists and state-criminal bureaucrats who have dreamed of exterminating groups of people, often with “ethnically tailored diseases” – but who have not succeeded. An example is described in the story of the Japanese sect Aum Shinrikyo – which was led by the almost blind guru Shoko Asahara in the 1990s. Asahara was obsessed with Armageddon – and in its end-time zeal, the doomsday sect tried out one biological weapon after another, botulinum, anthrax and, experimentally, Ebola – possibly taken from Zaire.
None of the bipo weapon attacks were particularly successful, but the real will and ability to cause harm was demonstrated emphatically: The sect, which had over 40 members, soon became notorious for its chemical attacks on the Tokyo subway in 000, which ultimately led to its disbandment. Several members, including Asahara, was convicted and then executed – as recently as 2018. What would have happened if they had operated today, with the knowledge and technology of the 2020s?
The century of biotechnology
The next pandemic could well come from a bioweapon developed in military laboratories, from bioterrorists – or at worst from a leak from laboratory scientists who want to defend ourselves against the same threat. We live in the so-called century of biotechnology, and we have not yet seen or realized what that will entail.
Although breakthrough technologies are coming one after another, the biotechnology revolution has only just begun. Debates about safety and ethical guidelines are unlikely to be enough to halt the development, which is at best miraculous – but which can also become a nightmare, as Frøland's excellent book shows – through a wealth of documented examples.
Frøland points out that biological warfare was condemned and rejected already in antiquity – as a dishonorable and vile tactic. Quite apart from the fact that a biological weapon can easily get out of control and backfire on itself. Almost all the development of bioweapons we have seen so far has taken place despite a corresponding condemnation in modern times. Thus, a moral criticism, if it is ever so important, risks breaking in open doors – or, conversely, knocking on bolted gates. What can we do beyond condemning bioweapons on moral grounds? As a secret, semi-criminal and criminal biotechnology The threat from bioweapons should be the subject of public debate – regarding both research practices, sanctions and preparedness.
