Asia's heavy-breathing tigers

"ASEAN no longer appears to be able to maintain its prominent role."

"The organization was unable to agree on one solution to the financial crisis."

But the result of ASEAN's diminished importance could be a new Asian economic bloc that will be a real counterbalance to the EU and US NAFTA. In such a block, however, ASEAN will not be the most important player, Camroux believes.

The Alliance of Asian South-Eastern States (ASEAN) aimed for rapid regional integration, and in the long run hoped to become an international political player. But some states – such as the Philippines, where President Estrada was forced to step down on January 20 this year – are on the verge of an institutional collapse. Other states, such as Indonesia, are experiencing strong growth. Does this mean that regionalization is dead? It is impossible to say for sure. On the other hand, it is beyond doubt that it is in North Asia, which includes China, Japan and (a united?) Korea, that a new international bloc will emerge.

Basic disagreements

On the one hand there are Malaysia looking for strategies to replace imports, and on the other, Thailand which will open up to transnational US and Japanese companies.

The financial crisis of the late 1990s clearly showed the major political and economic differences in the region. These are the basis for today's contradictions between the member states. In 1997-1998, both Thailand and Indonesia struggled with significant external debt, and with over-investment due to the speculative and short-term capital movement. The Malaysian economy, on the other hand, benefited from long-term foreign investment, while the debt was to a greater extent internal. The Philippines was the state that came out of it best because of the country's relative underdevelopment, and was therefore to a lesser extent affected by the speculative capital movements.

Moreover, the countries' solutions to the crisis were very different. Thailand and Indonesia had to accept the IMF and the World Bank's structural adjustment programs. Under Mohamed Mahatir's leadership, however, Malaysia advocated a completely different political solution. They chose to control exchange rates and demand growth by allocating substantial sums to public funds to maintain the ability of large corporations to pay.

Between pluralism and dictatorship

Initially, the implementation of the IMF's recommendations was painful. In Thailand, 56 financial institutions were declared insolvent, the companies' assets were sold at a bargain price and the debt was nationalized. As in Indonesia, subsidies for important consumer goods and products, such as petrol, were abolished. In both countries, the average standard of living has fallen sharply, while Malaysia, on the other hand, managed to pull out of this in time.

one liberal-democratic (Thailand, Philippines), one soft variant of an authoritarian regime interspersed with semi-democratic elements (Malyasia, Singapore), and a dictatorship (Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia) – not to forget Myanmar's totalitarian regime in Burma. Where Indonesia fits into this form is not good to say. In any case, it would be an illusion to regard ASEAN as an orderly political entity.

The organization was unable to agree on a single solution to the financial crisis. In Indonesia, it led to mass demonstrations, which in turn contributed to the fall of Suharto and the election of Abdurrahman Wahid – the fourth president since independence. In Thailand, the government, which had lost all confidence, was replaced, and in 1997 a new constitution was announced to combat corruption and to encourage a greater degree of transparency in the political system. In Vietnam, the regime slowed down on economic liberalization, which the Burmese junta, for its part, benefited from because they could intensify repression and isolation to an even greater degree. Malaysia's political problems were provoked by the country's own regime.

Philippines – a stateless nation

Because the Philippines has lacked a transition period, the country has become a stateless nation – as long as one can consider a country divided into separatist factions (with a religious background) to be a nation. After the fall of Marco in 1986, the ruling politicians have not been able to meet the enthusiasm for increased democratization. President Aquino's term (1986-1992) was marked by missed opportunities. This was especially true in connection with the agricultural reform, which in other countries (South Korea and Taiwan) laid the foundation for the economic revolution. And later during the reign of President Ramos (1992-1998), the hope of overcoming the ingrained corruption and political powerlessness faded.

Many Filipinos believed that Estrada's government, which was accused of corruption and removed from office, was as bad as dictator Marcos' government. He allowed many of Marcos' employees to regain their former positions of power, in addition to his own children being shockingly enriched by an established tradition derived from the prince and his court. Despite critical and rebellious pressure, corruption and abuse of power have not stopped. This can be partly explained by the fact that the country has a system that protects the political parties, and that local prominent people have long been the political dominant ones. It is also the explanation for why the Senate adjourned the trial against Estrada on January 17 last year, which led the opposition to mobilize the people. If that was what led to Estrada's departure on January 20 this year, it is still too early to see a victory for democracy in this, because many actors who were interested in such an outcome – and especially the army – had a hand in the game.

The Philippines' public sector is one of the smallest in South Asia, and in addition the social security fund has been privatized. Around the fortress-like suburbs, to which the affluent areas around Manila have developed, only those accepted by private security companies are allowed in. An important part of the education system is also privatized. The absence of the losing hint of societal interest competes with the permanent unrest in society.

Indonesia – a powerless state

The government floated on the surface of a society that was fundamentally divided and governed by either military or local governors, who enjoyed extensive independence. Civil society, which had already withered under Sukarno's rule, had very little to say – if not say anything – in the political debate.

Suharto's resignation came as suddenly as his takeover thirty years earlier. The extraordinary activity of the press, the emergence of a parliament that knew its rights and that would compete with the executive, and a legal apparatus that both discovered and consolidated its independence, were all signs that democracy would prevail. But this map did not quite match the terrain, for certain elements of the old regime had not said their last word, even though they kept a low profile. The most pessimistic observers in Jakarta – several of whom are part of Wahid's government – claim that the assassination attempts in the capital in the autumn of 2000 have ramifications into the army. These are forces that are trying to create chaos, in order to regain their political influence. The 18 attacks on Catholic and Protestant churches in December of the same year also appear to stem from the same strategy.

While many Indonesians look back nostalgically on their time with Suharto, the challenges facing Wahid's government, which is increasingly characterized by a transitional government, are enormous. The most urgent thing is to find a solution that suits the entire federation, and that can control the powerful centrifugal forces that have always characterized Indonesian society, but which after Suharto's fall suddenly and unexpectedly reappeared to the surface. Just as in the Philippines, it is the power of the state that constitutes the greatest obstacle to the implementation of the reforms needed to ensure political stability and economic development.

China threat

At the beginning of October last year, Thailand's currency fell to its lowest rate in 28 months, ie since the economic and financial crisis was apparently over. The West therefore began to seriously consider the possibility that the country would once again experience an economic downturn and a recurrence of the contagious financial disease from 1997-98. The fact is that the countries' export results, which are the most important engine in the renewed but very vulnerable economic growth in the last two years, have again begun to slow down for two reasons. First and foremost, the increase in petrol prices has been unfortunate for all the countries in ASEAN, except Indonesia. In addition, China's possible membership of the World Trade Organization (WTO) is considered a threat to its competitiveness. Both of these developments have gained increasing importance due to the declining investments in Malaysia and Indonesia.

ASEAN, which due to the region's historical background has been able to exploit its central geographical position in Asia to consolidate its political gravity, no longer appears to be able to maintain its prominent role. The organization nurtured the hope that a strong regional unit would stimulate development and benefit the member countries. But paradoxically, it is the internal political strife and the region's paralyzed state of affairs that threaten both national projects and the vision of regional cooperation. Still, it is possible to see the outline of a larger entity that – apart from ASEAN – includes China, Japan and South Korea. The reason for this is the many informal meetings, greater coordination between the various central banks, repeated proposals for the formation of an Asian monetary fund and the discussions about a possible yen zone.

A counterweight?

If this trend continues, the result could be an Asian bloc that will be a counterweight to the North American Free Trade Agreement and to the European Union. In such a context, ASEAN will not be the most central player, because the organization's influence is already under pressure due to China's entry into the international capitalist economy, and because the Japanese also have great ambitions for greater political significance.

In any case, this is a probable development, in addition, a possible union of South and North Korea strengthens the idea of ​​an Asian power triangle with a center in the north-east.