Kosovo is brewing for change

From November last year to February this year, over 50 000 Kosovars emigrated to the EU. The number is startling. Kosovo has a total of 1,8 million inhabitants. That is, almost three percent of the entire population emigrated in just ten weeks. There is peace in Kosovo and no war is threatening. What makes so many people try their luck in a new country? And what does the mass exodus tell about the state of Kosovo, seven years after the declaration of independence from Serbia in 2008?

Notifications. According to Andrea Lorenzo Capussela, author of the book State-Building in Kosovo: Democracy, Corruption and the EU in the Balkans (2015), the answer is that Western intervention admittedly liberated Kosovo from dictatorial supremacy – but left the population in the hands of a new, predatory elite. Capussela is an Italian academic who until 2011 served as head of the finance department of the International Civilian Office – the body responsible for overseeing Kosovo's civilian administration. He has now taken on the role of whistleblower. To Ny Tid, he describes the mass emigration in the winter of 2014–2015 as «unheard of in peacetime, no matter where». That the people of Kosovo sought a better future abroad, however, does not surprise him. Unemployment is sky-high – over 40 per cent for the general population, and about 60 per cent for young people under 24. Gross domestic product per capita is almost the lowest in Europe, and so are wages. But as Capussela sees it, it is not just poverty and bleak prospects that are driving Kosovo's people into exile.
"Just a few days before the mass escape began, a protracted political crisis was resolved," Capussela explains. “Two parties in parliament had enough support to block each other's attempts to form government. As they formed a grand coalition, the people realized that there was no change on the stairs – and then they left. "
According to Capussela, the coalition meant only more of the same thing: continued rule by an elite that has held power ever since the peace treaty in 2000. When they – once again – consolidated their grip on power, it was just as well for many to just travel.

Corrupt elite. Kosovo's elite consists of leadership figures from the Kosovo Albanian armed liberation struggle in the late 90s. Several Kosovo Liberation Army commanders (KLA in English-language sources, UCK in Albanian) formed political parties after the peace talks. These have since ruled Kosovo. The elite now controls Kosovo's public bodies – the judiciary, the media, business, bureaucracy and politics. According to a report adopted by the Council of Europe in 2011, it also controls criminal networks behind the smuggling of heroin from Asia to Europe, human trafficking and arms smuggling. The report also shows grave charges of war crimes. That these groups – made up of criminals and corrupt leaders – govern Kosovo is nothing new. What Capussela mentions in his book is that they hold power thanks to the West's uncritical support.

The well-functioning, liberal democracy the West promised to create before the bombing started, has never been established.

NATO's Alert. NATO's intervention in the Kosovo War in 1999 – a nearly three-month bombing campaign that drove Slobodan Milosevic's forces out of what was then a Serbian province – was highly controversial. First, the action violated international law. Second, it did not have support in the UN Security Council. Kosovo's efforts were to redefine NATO from its counterweight role to the Eastern bloc to its current role as a proactive player in the world arena. This made the intervention, according to Capussela, a prestige project without equal. Failure was not an option; criticism was ruled out. NATO fought a clean air war and did not go in with ground forces. That role got Kosovo's liberation army. This put KLA in a very advantageous situation. As NATO's allies, KLA was also protected from criticism. According to Capussela's presentation, this gave the army of liberation carte blanche for carrying out abuses during the war, and criminal activity committed afterwards.

Uncritical. The historical significance of NATO's intervention in Kosovo is considerable. Without the Kosovo War as a precedent, it would have been much more difficult to argue for NATO's subsequent actions in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya. This makes the impression of success in Kosovo fundamentally – establishing democracy through the use of bombing there, shows that something similar can be achieved elsewhere. This is what Capussela believes that the Kosovo elite has managed to exploit. From his position in the international administration, he observed that recommendations on combating corruption were overlooked – without explanation. This was never said anything about the public. The elite knew they could do whatever they wanted without consequences. The impression of success was too important to challenge them for their shortcomings. Of the huge sums – according to figures quoted in Capussela's book over $ 10 billion – that the West has pushed into Kosovo since 2000 to establish a functioning society, much has been wasted. Much has landed in the pockets of the elite and their associates. Very little has benefited the regular Kosovo. The well-functioning, liberal democracy the West promised to create before the bombing started, has never been established. But to say it in public, Capussela claims, is out of the question. That would be to admit that mistakes were made right from the beginning, and constitute a criticism of the very logic of NATO's bombardment diplomacy. According to Capussela, this constitutes a betrayal to the people of Kosovo. "By supporting the Kosovo authorities and ignoring their serious defects without ever publicly criticizing them, the West has not helped the people of Kosovo to achieve prosperity and democracy whatsoever," he concludes.

Norwegian assistance. Norway has been a significant contributor to Kosovo. Sverre Johan Kvale was the Norwegian ambassador to Kosovo in the late 2000s. He tells Ny Tid that Norway at that time had one of the largest annual aid budgets in Kosovo of around NOK 100 million. Capussela's book states that a school built with Norwegian funds was left unused for a year, because local authorities did not link the school building to the local electricity and sewer network, something they had committed to do. Capussela considers this an example of the elite's lack of concern for the interests of the people. Former ambassador Kvale, for his part, believes that this is a typical Balkan lack of punctuality. He otherwise fails to criticize Kosovo's leadership. "I can say a lot of bad things about politicians in the whole region," he told Ny Tid, "but I do not intend to do that. It serves no impact." Kvale further emphasizes that corruption is widespread in the Balkans in general, not just in Kosovo.

War crimes in court. In early August, Kosovo's parliament decided to set up special courts to bring KLA members accused of war crimes into the 2011 European Council report. This happened after prolonged and bitter political struggles. An important reason why many MPs opposed the decision was that they and their allies risk ending up on the prosecution bench accused of torture, massacre and organ smuggling. The lawsuits will not begin until next year and will be held in a neutral country – probably the Netherlands – with foreign judges. This is done so that political pressure does not affect the judicial process. The fact that Kosovo adopted these separate courts at all is due to intense pressure from the West. However, Andrea Lorenzo Capussela believes that there is no real settlement with Kosovo's elite, nor any course change in Western diplomacy. As he sees it, the courts will not lead to social change. "Until then, KLA and the war are too popular with the people of Kosovo," he says. "As long as the elite retains the support of the people, they remain safe." It is only by challenging the elite of the economic crime – which enriches it at the expense of the people – that one can make a real change, Capussela believes. "It would be far braver and far more expedient to attack Kosovo's elite in a field where they will not be supported by the people. Moreover, the war crimes are now only of historical significance. After the wars, the Serbs make up only five percent of the population. No preconditions for any new armed conflict exist. "

Hope. Still, Capussela manages to point to a new source of hope. The vast majority of the tens of thousands of Kosovans who sought a better life in the EU in the winter of 2014–2015 met closed doors. Residents of Kosovo are not entitled to travel to the EU without a visa, nor are they granted asylum. They are now returning. "If social and political forces that want reform in Kosovo could mobilize these people, convince them to activate and make them vote more carefully, then I think a movement for change can begin," Capussela believes. He adds that if that happens, it is not thanks to the international community, but despite it. "The West has not given these new powers any help whatsoever," the announcer concludes.

Jensen is a freelance journalist.
johannjensenjournalist@gmail.com.