Cold times. In recent weeks, the Cold War has cast its shadows on both politics, war and mentality in Europe.
(THIS ARTICLE IS MACHINE TRANSLATED by Google from Norwegian)
Until Wednesday, it could seem as if Russia and its lackeys in Ukraine, the extreme pro-Russians, are in full swing with their plans to destabilize and take over the port cities of Mariupol in the east and Odessa in the west. The killings of the overly 40 pro-Russians in a union building in Odessa could be used to stir up new actions: as invasions or "security missions" of anonymous, green men with guns.
In this way, Vladimir Putin could in practice secure the entire Black Sea coast south of Ukraine. The Kiev government would almost be locked in, with sea access at Putin's mercy. The road from Odessa to Tiraspol, the capital of Moldova's transnistrian republic, is short. Just over five to six miles. With control of the Crimean Peninsula and Odessa, the Russian-speaking outbreaks in Transnistria would have secured supply lines. And Putin's April dreams of "New Russia," with Putin's control of Moscow through the coast of Ukraine and all the way to Moldova, could be realized.
Then on Wednesday, another turn came: Putin said in a meeting with OSCE representatives that he would withdraw army forces from the border with Ukraine. And that he would postpone 11. May vote on increased regional self-government in eastern Ukraine. And that he could "approve" a presidential election in Ukraine 25. May.
Is the Cold War already over? Did the thug strike too fully before the ice got stuck?
That is another hasty conclusion, despite the fact that separatists in eastern Ukraine say they were confused and did not know what to believe and believe according to the Putin message. For the past few weeks, politics is not a coincidence, but part of a longer-term trend in strategic planning and policy. China, as the world's largest purchasing power economy, seems to Putin more attractive as a partner than the US, which is a sinking ship.
Already on Friday, May 9, the national sentiment can be played high again: "Celebration Day", the day (Moscow time) when Nazi Germany capitulated to the Soviet Union is celebrated. There will be another special celebration in Ukraine. Everything can and will be used against Ukrainians on one side or the other.
In this paper, we have tried to follow the newspaper's line of seeking a "third position" or a "third way" in this conflict as well: We have thus both criticized Putin's powerlessness and growing power and at the same time criticized Barack Obama's limited ability to -scale conflicts.
This line is not much liked: Doctor Bjørn Nistad thinks the newspaper should be boycotted because we draw criticism of Putin's strategy. And Jan Erik Grindheim, leader in The European movement and on the other side of the trenches in relation to Nistad, criticizes Ny Tid for being too critical of the EU's role – that is, some, such as Norway, which passively allowed the interim government to reduce Russian rights in Telenor.
This is how it can go, when Ny Tid is critical of all parties that run games and psychological warfare. Nevertheless, Grindheim gets himself to write that the newspaper thinks it is "better with an invasion from neighboring Russia" than support from Western Europe. This is how it goes when you become as one-eyed, as Nistad and Grindheim each, when they have to defend "their" party at all costs – that is, Putin / Russia or Merkel / EU.
Common to the two is that while Nistad is driving on with his Putin tribute, Grindheim fails to be critically distanced to his own union.
The fact that Ny Tid is critical of the exercise of authority in both Moscow and Kiev, and thus in the EU / Norway / USA – when they fire each other up unnecessarily, is not something we want to stop even if Grindheim and Nistad want it. The lack of criticism from the EU / Norway against the Kiev government's decision against the Russian minority language, and against its problematic violence against pro-Russians in eastern Ukraine, is something that not only weakens the credibility of all of us. It is also something that Putin's supporters have been able to use as "evidence" to get support for their Slavic cause, and then seek admission to Russia.
If nothing else, the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, Thorbjørn Jagland, was out in early February and warned against what could happen if the minority Russians were not secured votes or influence in parliament – something that the Kiev government has not yet done well enough. But others than Jagland should also be able to speak for the Russians. Then possibly much of the deadly actions of the last few weeks could have been avoided.
But it's not too late yet. We can create the rubbish ourselves.