(THIS ARTICLE IS MACHINE TRANSLATED by Google from Norwegian)
(Picture drawn by Inger K. Giskeødegård.)
Radar signals can be disturbed when eight wind turbines are built on Haram Island in Ålesund municipality. The rotor blades from each turbine will cover 2 large football pitches in the air and will therefore be able to send signals such as «ping pong balls». No impact assessments have been made of the problem. Disturbed signal was a probable contributor to the Asker accident in 1972. Now it can happen again.
It turns out that our authorities are not based on new knowledge and new guidelines. They have not made their own reports, simply because developer Viken County Municipality's company Zephyr has not ordered them. The Finnish company Talleri in Finland will be responsible for future operations. They call themselves Haram Kraft here in Norway, but are registered in Luxembourg.
So what will happen when very bulky turbines are built on a plateau right by the radar station on Gamlemsveten?
The rotor blades will make up 16 football pitches and stand like a vertical wall in the air. It will be sky high and wide wind industry which blocks. But the developer has not informed those who own and operate the radar. They are at Bodø Airport.
Then we in the resource group affiliated No to wind turbines on Haramsøya called them they could tell that they did not actually know that construction was underway. Their archives showed that they had not been involved since 2007.
The rotor blades on Haramsøya
Impact assessments on flight safety is very deficient and old. Maybe the developer just forgot that the radar is right next door? Then they gamble with our lives, and the safety of a large number of aircraft. For Bodø, national and international aircraft fly along the coast and out to sea.
Bodø Airport, by Avinor Flysikring AS, called ATCC, is completely dependent on the radar. They sit in front of large screens in a control room, and use the radar signals to instruct all air traffic. It becomes more difficult to guide the planes if the wind system obstructs the correct information. The 8 monster masts are built only 11-13 km away. It is very close.
The radar station covers everything from the Sognefjord in the south, to Ørlandet in the north – and in the west to the 0-meridian in the North Sea – inside the British sector. The area to the west is most exposed.
The rotor blades on Haramsøya will have a wingspan of 136 meters in diameter. That's the main problem. And no one has looked at this. Not a word has been written about rotor blades in any analyzes. A report from 2006 states that only the turbine tower has been assessed. The wings have been shown solely to give a sense of proportion. 15 years ago.
It became clear in 2010 that European aviation will risk assess all turbines closer than 16 km from the radar. On Haramsøya they are only 11-13 away.
Now we know much more. Former air traffic controller Odd Inge Løtveit reacted. He has extensive experience and was part of the Civil Aviation Administration's evaluation group for the acquisition of radar for both Gardermoen, Flesland and Sola. He writes in letter 21.2. to our resource group:
«Where it was previously assumed that reflections from wind turbines were to be regarded as from a static object, new knowledge has revealed that reflections from the turbine blades are thrown in all directions. The position of the turbine blades in relation to the radar transmitter changes in relation to the wind direction and also where in the circle the turbine blade is located at any given time. Signal reflection can come from aircraft up to 10-15.000 feet directly over radar or wind farm. Mathematical calculations have shown that reflected signals lose power outside a certain distance (16km). »
Possible "false targets" have been identified here that could disrupt those who control the airspace above and off the coast. Løtveit's letter further states: «Eurocontrol has prepared recommendations for investigating the consequences of wind turbines on radar systems. Eurocontrol describes three zones for which measures are to be implemented.
Zone 1: Within 500 meters of radar: No wind turbines
Zone 2: 500 meters – 16 km: Detailed impact assessment
Zone 3: Outside 16 km: No expected consequence ».
The requirements from Eurocontrol is from 2010 (revised 2014). So we have had the knowledge for 11 years, long before they started blasting on Haramsøya. Aviation safety is important, but no one has taken action. Therefore, we contacted a lawyer, who wrote to Avinor, Luftfartstilsynet and NVE and asked for their own assessments of flight safety. They are committed to this according to Eurocontrol.
We have also contacted Eurocontrol directly, because Norway does not follow up on our obligations to create a safe airspace. Normally we follow international obligations. Why not now? Is the wind industry trumping everything, even possible plane crashes? So far, the wind industry has set aside research, human rights, local democracy, environmental protection and efficiency, and now also aviation safety. For the government, one thought applies: "the climate goals". It is repeated as a religious creed.
In 2006, Teleplan assessed how radar and TV signals could be affected. Their report agrees well with what they knew at the time. So everyone agreed on the conclusions, without doing their own research. Avinor also did not have its own risk assessments.
Rightly enough, the Civil Aviation Authority first said no to development. Then they turned. Why? From expertise and air traffic controllers, we hear that if the developer had requested a departure from Avinor after 2010, they would hardly have received it, because increased risk is undesirable. They work hard to minimize all risk.
But openness had probably stopped the monster turbines on the small island. It did not happen.
As early as 2008, a US report pointed out the rotor blades, and in 2010 it became clear that European aviation will risk assess all turbines closer than 16 km from the radar. On Haramsøya they are only 11-13 away.
We believe that developer Zephyr has grossly neglected. It remains to be seen whether an absent decision basis will pay off. Will the license be declared valid? Despite the increased risk to aviation? Despite the fact that the rudder blades can become a trap?
The developer says here that the old license is valid, because it is based on the factual basis they had at the time in 2006. Such law is not based on common sense and a sense of justice. We believe in honesty, new knowledge, social security and research. Reality must trump very old and outdated notions in a state governed by the rule of law.
Dare the judiciary ignore the fact that the developer does not provide impact assessments on aviation safety – then they gamble with our lives.
If an accident happens, no one can say they did not know. Letter sent. Everyone knows.
The court should emphasize the security of the people and our social good, and not Zephyr's thin reports that seem ingeniously made to make big money.
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Red. Note: In the first version of the article, it said "The Asker accident happened because radar signals went astray" in the preamble and the first paragraph – radar signals were not the only cause, as it could be perceived. The report after the accident states that there were several unfortunate circumstances, from incorrect navigation (main cause) to inattention (irregular radio call), incorrectly set ADF in the aircraft with 100Khz, etc.