(THIS ARTICLE IS MACHINE TRANSLATED by Google from Norwegian)
"In order to avoid the mental pitfalls of the propaganda system, it is necessary to be aware of the means used by propaganda, to have the will to look at facts with an open mind, to test simple assumptions and to pursue an argument to its conclusion, and that one is determined to be a careful reader, ”writes Milan Rai somewhere in the book War goals Iraq – ten counter-perceptions which was released on Cappelen recently.
The quote may serve as a summary of an important line in the book – a call not to bite on Washington's and London's war rhetoric. But it can also serve as a reading manual for Rai's own book. One must read with caution. If you do, you will benefit greatly from this anti-war book.
Who is manipulating?
Rai, who is one of the founders of the political group Arrow (Active Resistance to the Roots of War), begins by showing how the United States had a large part of the responsibility for the inspectors being withdrawn from Iraq in December 1998 – with the subsequent United States -leaded the Desert Fox bombing campaign as a result. It was not, as the United States itself likes to claim, Iraq's lack of cooperation that led to the inspectors' disappearance. They were not "thrown out" but "pulled out".
Although Iraq did break off cooperation with UNSCOM in the late autumn of 1998, Saddam quickly came up with better ideas – he even sent a letter to the Security Council promising redress and improvement, without much help. In December, inspectors were instructed by the United States to withdraw. "Washington was prepared for a military action, and twisted and turned the wording of the letter and the addendum to create a confrontation that did not exist," Rai writes.
double Play
He believes this episode is typical of how the United States has used the inspectors and the inspection regime to advance its own goals in Iraq. He describes how the United States manipulated the inspectors in connection with a (failed) CIA-funded coup attempt in 1995, and how interception equipment that provided the United States with valuable intelligence material was placed together with the surveillance equipment of the inspectors in suspicious locations in Iraq. The four-day Desert Fox operation put an end to an inspection regime that Rai – with the support of Scott Ritter, a former weapons inspector and a controversial voice in the Iraq debate – describes as a success, even the only viable option, if a complete disarmament of Iraq is the goal: "In the case of Iraq, weapons inspections are an option, and certainly the only effective option."
What is the goal?
In other words, there are many indications that the United States' goal is something other than disarmament. Rai substantiates this by referring to the fate of the weapons inspections suffered in the previous round, and not least by turning attention to what actually happened in the immediate aftermath of the previous Gulf War. Bush senior signaled that the Iraqis should take up arms in order to overthrow Saddam, but when the uprising became a fact, the United States failed to help the Kurds in the north and the Shiites in the south. The Iraqis were given almost free rein to quell the uprising. The Republican Guard – Iraq's best-trained military unit – was spared by the Americans, and Iraq was allowed to use combat helicopters against the rebels, who in turn were denied access to abandoned Iraqi ammunition depots.
As Rai writes: "After urging the Iraqi people to take matters into their own hands by overthrowing their leader, President George W. Bush senior did everything he could to support the suppression of the unrest, except to order US tanks and aircraft to protect the crowd ”
Leadership change, not democratization
Why? Well, because there was no such revolt the United States had intended.
They did not want, nor do they want now, a "regime change", but a change of leadership, where anyone who comes after Saddam should preferably be similarly brutal to their own people so that Iraq does not disintegrate, with all the consequences it can sheep for regional stability. There is a risk that Turkey, Iran and Syria will interfere in the further fate of the autonomous Kurdish areas, and that at least Iran may interfere in the south. Something the United States can hardly accept for the sake of its allies in the region, with Saudi Arabia as the most central.
"The best world", in the eyes of the United States, is therefore a post-war scenario where a strong man from the Iraqi power elite takes over from Saddam, Rai argues.
The factual basis seems rich and the analysis correct, but the consequence is that Rai goes a long way in portraying the conflict as a personal settlement, where controlling Saddam becomes the central goal of Bush. The arguments of the US administration's hottest war advocates that Iraq should be democratized after a war are humbugs, while a mix of revenge motives and misguided American security considerations is what really hides the rhetoric of disarming Iraq through pre-emptive attacks and attempts to associate Iraq to international terrorism, he seems to think.
What about the oil?
In other words, anyone hoping to gain clarity on what the Bush administration's real motivation for the war is War objectives Iraq. For the reasons Rai outlines hardly appear as a rational justification for a war that costs billions of dollars, it will give the world economy a crack, and damage the reputation of the United States.
It is interesting to note that the author only uses seven pages (out of 280) to examine the significance of oil for the conflict – and these pages are essentially a historical review of oil-related American and British activity in the area. Not an analysis of how oil today affects the players.
Rai's perspective is an important complement to Chomsky and most other war opponents, who focus too much on the importance of oil. However, he is in danger of undercutting the strategic and economic significance of black gold. The few times the oil is mentioned, the analyzes are characterized by a stagnant accumulation of the said linguist and polemics.
outdated
That the book was outdated already when it came out is another obvious weakness. Especially when it comes to speculation about the extent of the US troop deployments in the Gulf, it turns out that Rai was wrong. He writes that the most likely scenario is an invasion force of about 80 men – neither birds nor fish, and a compromise between the Rumsfeld / Wolfowitz wing's desire for a war based on the "Afghan model", where American elite forces help local rebels with the support of a massive bombing campaign, and the Powell wing's desire for a larger invasion force that does not depend on local forces many believe is inappropriate both militarily and politically.
Today, however, we see a troop deployment of nearly 150 men, which is closer to what Powell imagines than the compromise Rai describes.
Ten reasons
But all this we shall leave now. The essence of War objectives Iraq are in fact the ten counter-perceptions that Rai presents in the central part of the book. These range from arguments most people have heard before – such as that Iraq does not pose a threat and that a war lacks legitimacy and is contrary to international law. Something Rai puts forward a long and intricate argument for. Via an appeal to the enormous and terrible humanitarian consequences a war can have – as the collapse of basic health services and sanitary infrastructure caused the bombing last time. To other and more surprising arguments in such a book: The screaming silence about what comes after the war – a new dictator is probably the goal of the United States, but one can just as quickly end up with a state collapse and a regional struggle for the remnants. Especially in Kurdistan, this is a possible scenario.
Surprising
Quoting the US generals' misconceptions, and other power-political arguments about how the strategic development of the Middle East will be affected by an Iraq war, also lifts the book because it gains new and unusual perspectives.
The conclusion is also clear. War solves no problems. Inspections are the only solution if the goal is to disarm Iraq – inspections of both Iraq, Iran and the other countries in the Middle East, Israel included. As long as both Israel and Iran can threaten weapons of mass destruction, and thus Iraq is squeezing, regardless of who is in power in Baghdad, there is little indication that an Iraqi government will voluntarily disarm.
Required
That such an inspection regime seems politically unrealistic, and Rai – like other critics – does not show a realistic alternative is a problem.
But still: “Collective intellectual self-defense can protect us from war propaganda, help mobilize public outrage against the impending war, and can therefore help save lives in Iraq. It is the propaganda war that is the real war, "writes Rai in the immediate vicinity of the quote that opened this review. The latter may be to take in, however War objectives Iraq is definitely mandatory reading for anyone who wants to get new and good arguments against the war. However, the real motives of the United States remain a secret. Perhaps this is also the strongest argument against war. The total absence of a rational and credible reason for endangering world peace.
