(THIS ARTICLE IS MACHINE TRANSLATED by Google from Norwegian)
It can go well and it can go bad. But everyone agrees that the stagnation and stagnation in the Middle East is an abandoned stage. Whatever happens next, the result will be a breach of the status quo. But no one dares to guarantee that the road to democracy is now open in this authoritarian part of the world.
No; apart from the US, then. There the cheer is on the roof for the time being. The new Conservatives are avenging back on the agenda after years of discouragement and setbacks. Because wasn't that what they said all along that the Iraq war would spread democracy and freedom in this region?
The elections in Iraq and Palestine, and the cedar revolution in Lebanon, are for the neoconservatives – and for the White House – a clear proof that the export of liberal values (sic) is both useful and fruitful. The world can change, if necessary with war, power, pressure and sanctions. It can even be changed for the better. It shows the ever-increasing cries for political and civil rights in an area that stretches from Yemen in the south to Lebanon and Syria in the north, and Morocco in the west.
And right should be right. The er in fact, something is going on in the Arab world. The common denominator for this "something" is the desire for free choice, free thought and free expression. In other words, it is about democracy, and the pressure builds up more from below and from within, than from without.
Speed up after 9/11
The discussion about reforms has been going on for a long time, in many countries. Therefore, it is difficult to refer to a specific event that initiated it. It is certain, at least, that the debate preceded the invasion of Iraq two years ago. But it is equally certain that the development and discussion accelerated after the "nine-eleven;" that is, after the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001.
It feeds a wing of revolutionary ideologues who believe that the reforms can be linked to the United States' deeper involvement in the Arab world. But that is just one of many factors. Two years later, in 2003, came the report that showed that the 22 countries in the Arab League had stagnated completely in relation to a modern world. For the first time, it was described, in black and white, how politically backward and economically undeveloping the then (and current) situation was.
It created shock waves, to use a worn-out metaphor. But also a growing recognition that there might be something in the violent punishment from the UN experts, who by the way were also Arabs. At least the debate was heavy and heated for months afterwards. Predictably, not much came out of it.
But something was, even though most of it happened on the outskirts and in the small states. Today, Morocco has a lively political debate with several parties participating in elections, even though it all takes place under the auspices of a monarchy in which King Mohammed VI still has real power. In Algeria and Tunisia, the two presidents Abdelaziz Bouteflika and Zeineddine Ben Ali have a direct mandate from the electorate, although the elections are always manipulated and the challenger candidates thoroughly scrutinized and scrutinized in advance. In Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and Oman, there are parliaments today where voters decide the composition and content of politics. In Bahrain, Qatar and Oman, women can already vote. Kuwait says they will follow in the next election.
Democracy has reached the strangest places, as in Yemen, which boasts both a parliament and a free press. But it has also reached Jordan, where King Abdullah has been at the top of a regime that has been partly democratic, partly authoritarian. Now the plans are there for a decentralization of political power to elected bodies in the regions. Democracy is creeping up everywhere, even though it is never so fragile and incomplete. It is a cautious start, but palpable in a region that has not exactly been known for its intellectual and political discourse, to put it that way. Until now, however, the heavyweight countries in the heart of the Arab world have been spared too strong demands for popular representation and free debate. But that is about to change.
Creeps into the center
In the heart of the Arab world are countries such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iraq, Syria / Lebanon and Palestine. Everyone is central in their own way.
Saudi Arabia cultivates a Sunni fundamentalist direction within Islam, Wahhabi, which many believe produces terrorists and jihadists on an ongoing basis. The Saudi royal house has therefore been the target of much of the anger and frustration that has been poured out on the Muslim world since the assassination.
Egypt is important in terms of its actual and potential role as a leading nation in the Arab world. Iraq is important because this is where the war and the "democratic experiment" take place. Syria plays a key role because the country – reportedly – is deliberately undermining the desires for peace and democracy throughout the region. Without a free Palestine, the Arab world will not go a step further, as it is this conflict that today feeds hatred of the West and modernity and democracy and all kinds of imperialist atrocities.
But now there is a spring solution all over Fjøla, and as the regular columnist Roger Cohen in International Herald Tribune says it: “Had Arafat returned from the afterlife today, he would have rubbed his eyes in disbelief. "It is only 16 weeks since Arafat died."
Or to quote Lebanese Druze leader Walid Jumblatt: "The Iraqi elections were the Arab response to the fall of the Berlin Wall."
It is therefore about the elections in Iraq on January 30, when the Arab world – in disbelief, disapproval or awe – saw eight million voters defy the threats of Islamists and terrorists and proudly wave their purple-colored fingertips. It accelerated the discussion elsewhere. Because when the Iraqis could go to the polls, during occupation and in the middle of a war, how much easier would it not be for the "free" Arab world to do the same?
The Saudi kingdom took the reins and called for partially free elections to local councils – minus the women, of course. Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak announced that the constitution would be amended to allow real candidates ahead of the next presidential election. In the Palestinian Occupied Territories, the result of their own election was still celebrated, and not least the new "technocratic" government in which the Arafat lackeys shone with their absence. In Lebanon, they took the plunge and invaded the streets.
Everywhere the opposition – the Western-minded and liberal – began to speak with greater zeal and in a shorter time perspective about the possibilities for imminent political reforms. Arab media spewed out the message of a new mentality where extremism, martyrdom and fundamentalism were about to succumb in favor of large, popular currents with hope, human dignity and rights on the agenda. Liberal intellectuals gathered on the streets of Cairo, while women were already talking about the next election in Saudi Arabia.
In the last two weeks, the cedar revolution has been going on in Lebanon. Following the elections in Iraq and Palestine, the events in Beirut are a formidable source of inspiration for impatient pro-democracy activists in all Arab countries. For the first time, a government in an Arab country has had to go after popular uprisings and pressure. But many also wonder if this can go well.
What's happening in Lebanon?
And therein lies the doubt. Because there is – as I said – as great a chance that this can go bad as that it can go well.
The paradox in this situation is that the "free" elections and the popular uprising have come ashore under some form of occupation. In Iraq, it happened on American bayonets. But more importantly, the war could still end in disaster and make Iraq a model of terror rather than a source of inspiration. Nor does anyone know how many actually see Iraq as the equivalent of the fall of the Berlin Wall.
In Palestine, Israel has full control over natural resources, borders, territories and peoples. A state of its own may well emerge on paper. But where should this state be? Everyone who has traveled in the West Bank sees that Israeli settlers have taken large and contiguous areas inside the occupied territories. A state presupposes the withdrawal of both settlers and Israeli soldiers. The internal struggle for the few thousand settlers in the Gaza Strip does not exactly indicate that hundreds of thousands of Israelis will evacuate the West Bank voluntarily.
President Mahmoud Abbas can probably manage to reform the Palestinian administration, create new confidence in the leadership and clean up the security structures. But no sustainable state will he be able to go to port. Thus, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict will continue to be a trauma throughout the Arab world, rather than a source of inspiration and a beacon for democratization.
In the short term, however, it is the situation in Lebanon that matters most. Will the Lebanese be able to overthrow the Syrian occupier? And will they avoid the destructive division between different ethnic groups that threw the country into a 15-year civil war thirty years ago?
The development this week has been disturbing. The Shia alliance Hezbollah has, after some hesitation, chosen to ally itself with the Syrians. At the same time, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and his Lebanese counterpart Emile Lahoud have announced that a Syrian withdrawal has been put on hold until further notice.
It provides an alliance between the Druze, the Christian Maronites and the Sunni Muslims who demand Syria and the ousted Syrian president, while the Shiites, the ousted government, the intelligence and the president demand the absence of external interference and continued Syrian presence – although the latter have barely dared to formulate his position in the face of popular anger.
Something that may change now, after hundreds of thousands of Lebanese have demonstrated their support for Syria and the old regime.
It's a great power game so it lasts. And it is the United States that shakes the boat, of course. For the Americans, it is not Lebanon itself that is important, but the wing-cutting of Syria. According to the United States, Syria is a country that is stirring up resistance in Iraq, sending money to Hezbollah terrorists and suicide bombers to Israel. In addition, the country has chemical weapons, and is in alliance with Iran to counter the geopolitical interests of the Americans. Syria must leave, and a Syria without Lebanon is weak, to quote Syrian Minister Bouthaina Shaaban.
But is it a given that Syria gives up without a fight? Following Resolution 1559 (see below), Syria responded by extending the mandate of pro-Syrian President Emile Lahoud. It was this simple action that led Rafik Hariri into the opposition. On Monday, the message came that the withdrawal of the forces would still not take place in the short term. It was the day after the Shiites announced their support for Damascus. Syria also plays the cards they feel they have in Lebanon.
The United States, for its part, is using the assassination of opposition prime minister Rafik Hariri for all its worth. The Lebanese opposition's desire for a free and independent Lebanon is probably both real and legitimate. But it fits like a glove into Americans' strategy in the Middle East.
Democracy, war or chaos?
This strategy operates on several levels. The overall project is to create anti-terror bastions in the Middle East, where regimes must be democratized to counter the rise of Islamic terrorism. This applies to countries such as Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Egypt. And the pressure for reform is probably real enough, even though the United States still prioritizes stability over anarchy and political unrest.
In relation to Syria, the United States is working to isolate the regime, not least through Security Council Resolution 1559, which calls for Syrian forces to leave Lebanon, free elections and the disarmament of all paramilitary groups in the country. This will also remove or reduce the threat to Israel from Hezbollah and the Syrian-backed Islamic Jihad and Hamas. The hope is probably that the weak Syrian regime will collapse by itself as a result of the pressure. It could open up a new leadership and cautious reforms in Damascus as well.
In relation to Iran, the Americans have taken a line where they do not want to bomb, for the time being, but rather threaten and entice the regime to cooperate, together with the Europeans.
In Palestine, they must work so seriously on the road map that the world – and the Middle East – are given new hope for real peace.
All of this can just as easily take the life of cautious democracy experiments as promote them. In Syria, the result could just as easily be coups, or chaos – or perhaps an Islamist regime. In Lebanon, the conflict can quickly take the form of total confrontation. Throughout the Middle East, the result could be ethnic strife between Shiites and Sunnis, as in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, or between Muslims and secularists, as in Egypt. In Iraq, many believe that the civil war is already under way.
It is life-threatening social engineering. But one thing is clear: with or without the United States, young, highly educated and urban people – and there are now very many of them – will demand change in a new era. The authoritarian regimes in the Middle East will fall. The pressure has built up from within and from below for a long time. And demographics are a powerful force when expectations are not met.
Whether the result will be democracy is a completely different question. Expect a repressive response from the incumbent regimes when religious and ethnic groups, women, liberals of all shades, and others, demand their rights.
