Dating with history

On the one hand, a country that for decades has not had competition associated with its status as a regional superpower. A country well protected by the US military umbrella, with the world's second largest economy, and so unmatched in Asia that the country voluntarily imposed itself a ban on the offensive use of armed forces.

A country whose main absence of formal power is about the place it does not have in the Security Council. A country called Japan, with 130 million inhabitants, a modern economy, technological expertise, advanced naval forces and political pluralism.

On the other hand, a growing giant, with 1.3 billion inhabitants, and increased military, political and economic presence in both Asia and the rest of the world. A country that doubles its gross domestic product every ten years, and in many ways is the hub of the new, globalized economy. A country that is restoring, is forming alliances with other states in the region, is building deep-water ports from Pakistan via Bangladesh to Myanmar, and already has a seat in the council: China.

Two regional powers in dispute, with the war as a temporary motive. It is a conflict that has long awaited its date meeting with history.

Alliances in the West

Why is Japan afraid of China? And why is China afraid of Japan? In China, the Tokyo authorities are suspected of using every trick in the fight against China's increasing influence. Japan fears a China that will soon dominate the region both politically and economically.

At first glance, it may seem that Japan has the most to lose, and thus also the most to fear. For China is no longer happy to grow economically. They want political power and military capacity that matches the strength of the economy. In short, they will use the money to gain influence and strategic positions in Asia – and in the world.

Two weeks ago, Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao was in India. There he met his counterpart Manmohan Singh for talks that were apparently very productive. Not only did China and India agree on a "strategic partnership." But the two countries also signed an agreement that the disputed border areas in the north will no longer be an obstacle to fruitful cooperation between Beijing and New Dehli.

And – not least: China has promised to support the Indians in their demand for a seat on the UN Security Council.

It paved the way for a more "clarified" relationship between the two largest states in the world. But not cordially. Just days before he met Manmohan Singh in India, Wen Jiabao had been in Pakistan and signed various agreements with the authorities in Islamabad. One of the agreements concerned the construction of a deep-water port in the Pakistani port city of Gwadar.

Those who follow China – and the Japanese do – see that the Chinese think strategically all the way to the end. It is as if they have already put the race that will drive China into a confrontation with Japan. When the Chinese look west, they see a chain of strategic alliances and economic positions. If they look east, they see political strife and rustling with the sabers.

There is no westbound planking either. Many in the region fear a dominance that could send the Chinese fleet into the Arabian Sea, the Indian Ocean and the Bay of Bengal. In Gwadar, the Chinese will build a deep-water port, and in the long run, perhaps link it to an oil pipeline to China. In Myanmar, the Chinese are upgrading the ports of Yangon and Kyaukpyu, while installing a listening post on the so-called Coco Islands. In Bangladesh they are upgrading the ports of Chittagong, and in Cambodia they are in Sihanoukville.

In other words, it is about calling India, not just making appointments with them. But there is only one strategic gain. First and foremost, China has placed itself in a position to monitor US military activity and secure supply lines for oil and other commodities through the Strait of Malacca.

Playing with the fire

The thought of a Chinese navy all the way into the Strait of Hormuz creates fear and trembling in both Washington and Tokyo – and also, of course, in New Delhi. But India and China have the most to gain from trading with each other, not from wars. India has software where China has hardware. India has raw materials that the Chinese desperately need.

China and Japan also trade with each other. In fact, they are each other's most important trading partners. But there is so much else at stake in the Japanese-Chinese relationship. And the four concrete issues are 1: the war, 2: border disputes in the East China Sea, 3: Japan's desire for a seat on the Security Council and 4: Taiwan.

The fierce anti-Japanese riots in Beijing and elsewhere have fueled the war and the fact that 35 million Chinese died at the hands of the Japanese in the 30s and 40s. This has been linked to new school books in Japan that Beijing believes are laundering the occupiers, and the lack of willpower and remorse. Things have not improved either, since Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi has repeatedly visited the Yasukuni Memorial, where many of Japan's war criminals are buried.

But the war is 60 years old. And even though the Chinese can at any time bring out a real rage over the Japanese abuse in China, this kind of demonstration does not happen by itself. It is believed that the regime both initiated and allowed for demonstrations against and physical destruction of Japanese property in China. The recent days' attempts to curb the rebellion have been interpreted as a fear that it will all slip out of control.

What one sees, in other words, is the life-threatening manipulation of chauvinistic nationalism that other (ex-) communist regimes have burned on in the past. And what one may ask is why the regime suddenly wants to play on an ideology that can admittedly direct the people's frustration outwards and not inwards, but which also has the power to overthrow all competing mindsets – such as communism.

One can guess that the Chinese authorities are doing this to create the necessary political backdrop for China's veto against permanent Japanese representation in the Security Council. Twenty million Chinese are said to have already signed an online petition against this, and Beijing seems to have decided that Tokyo will not get such a place – something they will not get if China uses its veto.

In that case, the ouster of nationalist riots is a step in the regional power-power rivalry between Japan and China, which sounds likely.

But there may be other reasons too, which are more about domestic matters. The uneven economic development in China, combined with wild expropriations in the countryside, has created enormous frustration among large sections of the Chinese population. The excitement is palpable, and ideas may well be invested in directing this mind toward an external enemy rather than the Beijing authorities.

If so, play with the fire. And in that case, China will initiate new confrontations with Japan, in the East China Sea, and also with the United States, in relation to Taiwan.

The rivalry with Japan may be the foundations of the finds in short term. But it is also dangerous, both in the short, medium and long term.