(THIS ARTICLE IS MACHINE TRANSLATED by Google from Norwegian)
Last week, Aps former party secretary Haakon Lie came with the book The way I see it now (CappelenDamm), admitting, among other things, that in earlier times he should have been more critical of Israel and its politics.
Now comes a new book that suggests that Lie was behind a startling military transport to an Israel in war: at just over four night to Monday 8. October 1973, 50 tons of ammunition, about 2000 tanks of caliber 105 millimeters, were removed from the Army's weapons store at Hauerseter. They were secretly driven to the military airport at Gardermoen, where four Hercules transport aircraft and a Transall machine were waiting.
The weapons were going to Israel, as two days earlier, the 6. October, had been attacked by Egypt and Syria in the so-called Yom Kippur War. This is stated in Trond S. Paulsen's new book Cold war. Norwegian intelligence agent behind the Iron Curtain, which will be launched tomorrow by Aschehoug It also states that the weapons from Norway arrived in Israel for a full six days before the country received similar assistance from the US, and that there was considerable resistance to extracting weapons from US stocks in several European countries.
Paulsen points out that official Norwegian policy saw a full stop in arms exports to countries in war or civil war. In general, there was also great restraint in the sale of military equipment to the various parties in the Middle East.
In October 1973, the government of Lars Korvald (Kr.F.) had its last days, but according to Paulsen, it was not involved in the decision to deliver weapons to Israel. He therefore writes: “Those who organized the delivery must have operated outside the regular political and administrative system. They knew that the government could not say yes to such support. The delivery to Israel therefore had to be kept strictly secret, including in relation to political and military leadership. "
The new Labor Party government, with Trygve Bratteli in the lead, did not take the helm until October 16, over a week after the raid on Hauerseter. Nevertheless, Paulsen suggests that key players in the Labor Party and in LO may have had a finger in the game. Two candidates in particular stand out, namely the powerful party secretary Haakon Lie, and former home front-runner Jens Christian Hauge.
In 1973, the powerful party secretary Haakon Lie was a sworn friend of Israel. In conversations with the author, Lie has said that he does not know of any military support during the Yom Kippur war. He refers to Jens Christian Hauge, who in turn has claimed that Haakon Lie «would start a campaign for the cause of Israel. It was no small ally for the state of Israel. "
Nevertheless, Paulsen believes that Lie, who kept up to date on the course of the war, probably "with weight conveyed his impressions". IN As I see it from 1975, Lie also points to LO leader Tor Aspegren and Labor Party secretary Ronald Bye as the only two who "showed men against those days". Bye has informed the author that he was familiar with the arms deliveries, but not with the fact that they had the scope described in the book.
- This is completely new information for me, says Hilde Henriksen Waage, who is a history professor at the University of Oslo.
She can not confirm the information that emerges in the Cold War, but believes that a weapons delivery in the autumn of 1973 is very likely. She also agrees with Paulsen that Haakon Lie and Jens Christian Hauge must be considered the two most likely culprits.
- If they have done it, then it fits into a pattern, and if they have done it then it is no wonder that they did it exactly in 1973. Here it is a long prehistory and a scroll. The official Norwegian policy was not to supply weapons to states at war, but in 1948, 1956 and 1967, Lie tried to make an exception for Israel. At one time, for example, he wanted to sell 30 decommissioned aircraft to the country, says Henriksen Waage.
The Middle East expert does not know where the planes ended up, and opens up that they may have been chopped up.
- But the example shows that strong forces in the Labor Party were willing to do anything to save Israel. They were willing to take some shortcuts to save David from an Arab Goliath, she says.
In both 1956 and 1967, support for Israel was unequivocal and massive across the political landscape in Norway. According to the researcher, this had changed somewhat in 1973.
- It was no longer the case that important supporters were simply mobilized to deliver weapons to Israel, says Henriksen Waage.
Yet that was exactly when it happened, according to Paulsen's book.
- For the first time, Israel fought a two-front war. In the first days, the situation was also very serious for the Israeli forces. They were surprised, and that on the holiest day of the Jews, Yom Kippur. It is almost beyond doubt that Israel in such a situation begged and asked for weapons from its supporters, and the political complications that delayed deliveries from the US probably contributed to Norway being asked so early, she says.
Henriksen Waage believes that a main reason for the secrecy must have been the need to act quickly.
- What amazes me, however, is how you can do such things "on your own". There must have been someone in the system who approved of such an action, she says.
Lie responds
Paulsen asks rhetorically: "Who steered the case and found those who could organize and carry out the work? Haakon Lie […], a great friend of Israel, in 1973 still had a great influence in Norwegian society. "
- This is free imagination, says Haakon Lie to Ny Tid. He denies having been involved in any arms shipments.
- In 1973, I did nothing but organize a fundraiser. So weapons? No, I had nothing to do with that. The same applied to the Finnish war, says Lie, who thus rejects Paulsen's argument that he also earlier, in February 1940, must have contributed to a secret arms transport to a country at war.
The planes that Henriksen Waage mentions, however, he says that he tried to get off. But whether they reached, he does not know. It was Jens Christian Hauge who was responsible for that kind.
In the book, Paulsen writes that the arms delivery may have taken place even without Lie or Hauge's participation, and points to a widespread sympathy for Israel in the Norwegian defense in the early 1970s. The "lending" of a total of 2000 tank grenades from Hauerseter may have been part of an ongoing military collaboration between Norway and the United States, and it may have been considered inappropriate at a high military level to have it cleared the service route.
- But do you think it is likely that there may have been any such transport of weapons from Norwegian military depots to Israel in 1973, Haakon Lie?
- No. I know absolutely nothing about that. We were probably not in government either, at that time. And even though Korvald was a nice guy, I doubt he would send weapons, says Lie.
I Ice Cold War Paulsen also reveals that there were secret Norwegian intelligence operations in the countries behind the Iron Curtain, also later than what has been known so far. According to the author, the Lund report gives the impression that no agents were sent into the Soviet Union with Norwegian aid after 1954. The book, which conveys the story to intelligence veteran Hoel (a pseudonym), tells of several trips behind the Iron Curtain. , which this individual agent participated in. In 1972, Hoel snuck into a military area near Alakurtti, looking for information on the capacity of the field airports the Russians were building on the Kola Peninsula. In 1974, Hoel was hunting for a Soviet submarine off Szczecin, Poland, and in 1976 he traveled to Meissen in the GDR to investigate whether Soviet tanks had been modernized.
Trond S. Paulsen:
Ice Cold War
Norwegian intelligence agent behind the Iron Curtain
Aschehoug (2008)
277 pages
