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Israel's new low target

Israel has reached a new low in its fine-tuned abuse policy.




(THIS ARTICLE IS MACHINE TRANSLATED by Google from Norwegian)

The Israelis know exactly how far they can go in their brutal occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. They cannot drive in the entire military force, shoot down Palestinians on foot or otherwise carry out a boastful offensive. But they can drive the kind of low-intensity war that sends one ceasefire after another – and one peace agreement after another – onto the scrap heap of history.

In recent weeks, they have repeated their tactics of actively torpedoing small brackets of relative calm. The pattern is known. As soon as the weapons are silenced on the Palestinian side and civilians are no longer bombarded with bloody meat slivers in Israeli cities, Israel finds some Hamas leader they can go in and liquidate. And as soon as the Hamas leader, or the Islamic Jihad leader, is liquidated, a new suicide bomber is dispatched from the poor quarters of hopelessness to realize his disgusting martyrdom.

But Israel is driving the spiral upward. Or maybe downhill. Israel is the military force. Israel is the occupying power. It is Israel, as the strong party, that sets the framework for what is possible or not possible in Palestine.

They run a policy that necessarily makes its own citizens victims of the suicide bombers. And then they use the victims to create sympathy for an occupation that in all other respects would be strongly condemned.

Same procedure...

This summer, the pattern has become clearer than ever before. First came the ceasefire on June 29, which was joined by both Hamas, Islamic Jihad and the Al Aqsa martyrs. It lasted until August 8, when Israel found it opportune to conduct a major raid on Nablus in search of "terrorists." Four Palestinians were killed in this operation, which was a direct breach of the ceasefire. The raid led to two small suicide bombings on August 12, in which two Israelis were killed.

At the same time, Hamas and Islamic Jihad made it clear that the suicide attacks were to be taken as punitive actions in protest of the Nablus raid. They both stated that they still wanted to respect the ceasefire agreement.

Not many days later, the Israelis were back on track. On August 14 there was a new raid, this time in Hebron. Among those killed was Islamic Jihad leader Mohammad Sidir. This time the prey was bigger and fatter, and the militants promised revenge. Meanwhile, the Israeli army had bulldozed the homes of the two suicide bombers behind the August 12 attacks.

The revenge from Hamas and Islamic Jihad came on August 19, when Raed Abdel-Hamed Mesk, dressed in typical Jewish Orthodox clothing, blasted a bus in Jerusalem that left 21 killed and 110 wounded. Two days later, it was Israel's turn to play. Moderate Hamas leader Ismail Abu Shanab was killed in a helicopter attack in Gaza, while a number of staff from the local governor's staff were injured.

Thus, the Israelis had taken away the man behind the ceasefire agreement with Israel in Hamas, and the man who was the group's liaison to Palestinian Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas. It was a targeted liquidation, and the question followed: what does Israel have to gain from putting the moderate forces on the Palestinian-Muslim side out of play?

A bluff

The road map for peace has been a bluff from the very beginning. But in a way, it is okay for Israel to have regular rounds of peace talks because it always causes the Palestinians to come out worse than before when the rounds end.

After 40 years of occupation, the negotiations today are about whether the Palestinians should have a right of disposal over a fraction of a fraction of their original land. It's about a roadblock here, and an access there. In Gaza, the "transfer" of land allowed Palestinians to drive from north to south for the first time without encountering Israeli roadblocks.

Gaza and Bethlehem, that was what the Israelis had to offer in the first place. Later, the Palestinians were promised Jericho and Qalqiliya, Tulkarm and Ramallah.

Now it was never Israel's intention to give back any of these cities. The proposal was intended as Israeli proposals are always intended; as a mere provocation. The most important cities were left out. Jericho is already under Palestinian control. And Bethlehem? Well, there the Israelis have replaced their iron ring inside the city with one that goes right outside.

The same with settlements. Frozen settlements were interpreted on Israel's side so that more could be built within existing Israeli land. Demolition of settlements was limited to a few empty barracks where no one lived.

And then there were the prisoners; Palestinians in captivity in Israel. There was no requirement in the road map that they should be released, but Israel still promised it – as a symbolic marking of their will for peace.

First, the 330 was released. Recently, another 73 were bused to freedom in Palestine. But almost all of them are insignificant criminals, or Palestinians who were simply arrested for illegally entering Israel. Many of them had only weeks and days left to zone anyway.

This is what leads to rage on the Palestinian side. And fury leads to chaos. Hamas and Islamic Jihad are gaining support, and Palestinians are being radicalized. Radicalization leads to several suicidal actions.

It is a good fit for the Israelis. For no one in the world is going to demand of Israel that they give the land back to a people who have vengeance and martyrdom, incandescent Jew hatred and the annihilation of Israel as their national myth.

Destructive resistance

It may not be to Israel's advantage that the Palestinians are completely out of control. But it is definitely an advantage that they are divided and demoralized, that the state is weathering, that Yasser Arafat and Mahmoud Abbas are arguing over the rags, that the security services are uncoordinated and lack a central command, and that Hamas and Islamic Jihad refuse to cooperate with their " national ”authority.

One of those who wanted to collaborate; and who had contact with Abbas, was Ismail Abu Shanab. Then he was gone. For Abbas had a vision; a vision that the Palestinians should unite in a common and non-violent front against Israel and where everyone should participate in a political effort to get the Palestinian autonomy up and standing.

The little benevolence he encountered in his own people was due to his ability to create a ceasefire and a flick of new hope. But Israel's destructive resistance became too strong. Today Abbas, Arafat and the suicide groups are sitting on their own, each with their own political program. It fits Israel perfectly well.

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