(THIS ARTICLE IS MACHINE TRANSLATED by Google from Norwegian)
Thomas Hook: British Ethical Theorists from Sidgwick to Ewing. Oxford University Press, 2014.
Thomas Hurka was born in 1952 and is a Canadian philosopher. He taught at the University of Toronto from 1978 to 2002, and earned his doctorate at the University of Oxford. His book British Ethical Theorists from Sidgwick to Ewing deals with normative, non-naturalistic ethics – a form of ethics that deals with what is right and good. Hurka looks at the evolution of modern English moral philosophy, presented through a series of British ethical theorists from the 19. and 20. century, among them Henry Sidgwick, GE Moore, WD Ross, Hastings Rashdall, HA Prichard and AC Ewing.
Thoughts and acknowledgments. If you want to get acquainted with the basic thoughts in the philosophy of morality, you do not get out of Immanuel Kant and his Critique of the common sense from 1781. One of Kant's many distinctions was between thoughts and acknowledgments. Recognizing something requires experience; we may well have thoughts and notions of trolls and unicorns, but we cannot have any recognition of them: Recognition presupposes experiences, which in turn presuppose sensations in the empirical world. Having a fantasy about something is not the same as having a true acknowledgment of something. However, moral questions we can have true recognition of, according to Kant. IN Critique of the common sense he writes: "I suppose that there are really pure moral laws, which completely a priori (irrespective of empirical motives, that is, bliss) determine the do and the charge, that is, the use of a reasonable being's freedom whatsoever, and that these laws commands absolutely (not only hypothetically assuming other empirical purposes) and thus are necessary in all respects. I can rightly assume this assumption, not only as I invoke the evidence of the most enlightened moralists, but I also refer to the moral judgment of every man when he clearly thinks of a law of that kind. "
The action and the consequences. This does not mean that there is no disagreement about what is good and right. A suggestion of what is good reads: "what is worth achieving for its own sake". To achieve the good, one must do the right thing. The distinction then lies between what one attaches the most importance to: the action itself, or the consequences of the action.
To achieve the good, one must do the right thing.
There is a fundamental difference in ethics between deontological ethics and consequence ethics: The deontological school emphasizes motives for the action, while the consequentialist emphasizes consequences the action gets. For those who emphasize the consequences, it does not help if the action was well intended, because it can still lead to something unforeseen that can quickly have a negative outcome. The deontological school, however, doubts the possibility of being able to see all the consequences of an action, and doubts whether one can find out which is the best in the individual case.
"When my own moral conviction of what is right never has to waver, it is because it has universal validity," Kant wrote. This is in contrast to the indoctrinal belief, which is based on shaky foundations. This does not have to mean that there are not enough philosophical problems to discuss when it comes to the practical world.
Good and straight. "How many normative judgments are there?" is one of the philosophical questions that the mentioned philosophers asked themselves. Put more simply: "How many absolutely certain moral judgments are there?" Minimalist conceptualism is a form of thinking that believes that there are only a very few certain moral judgments. Among the most radical minimalist conceptualists are those who believe that there is only one normative concept: "the good", which is desirable for any subject. At the same time, this school was aware that the term "the good" has many different meanings in our daily lives, and was skeptical of being guided by the common use of language.
Other philosophers, such as Broad and Ewing, including the minimalists, proposed another basic concept, namely, "the right thing to do." "The right thing" is what fits best in the individual situation. With the help of "the right" one can achieve "the good", and "the good" was for these two what one should strive for. Broad and Ewing approached a form of hedonism, though not in absolute form, as reason should keep emotions in balance.
"Goodness" is a non-reducible concept. So also «the right». None of these can be justified on the basis of anything other than itself. However, some place the greatest emphasis on what is practically feasible, while others emphasize the goodness itself.
So where is the difference between objective and subjective judgments? First, your view of what is right is related to many other of your subjective views, both moral and non-moral – and of course whether you are a consequence ethicist or a temperamental ethicist. If you think you want to save a friend from an illness by giving him a pill, but your friend actually dies from it instead, what then? And who can decide on an objective basis whether the action was right or not? The judgment of this action will depend on whether one emphasizes the intention or consequence of the action. But if so, what is your subjective assessment based on? Reason or emotion? Or maybe intuition? And what exactly is the difference between "the good" and "the right"? And – if you define one concept with the help of the other, do you not then move in a circle (a circle closure is known to be logically invalid)?
Theory and practice. Imagine that you have promised to visit a friend, but during the meeting you encounter a person who has been injured in traffic and needs help. We can say that both virtues, both to keep their promise and to help people in need, are first faction (basic) virtues. Which of them weighs the heaviest? Since both virtues are first faction, no one can decide this except yourself. But on what basis do you decide that? One thing is to know what feels right at the moment; another thing is to think more deeply about the issue, something there is not always time for. There are no universal laws that can apply in any situation; such a thing can only apply through its form, such as: "You must act so that what you do can be made a general law." This is the moral law here. But it is not possible to formulate a law that is both universal and at the same time has a practical content. In the practical world, philosophers will constantly have to argue about what is right.
Morality and intuition. Another part of the book is about the role of intuition in moral philosophy. As Thomas Hurka writes: "They thought we could know some moral truths by indirect insight or intuition, and were therefore moral intuitionists."
What is your subjective assessment based on? Reason or emotion? Or maybe intuition?
In the subchapter Moral intuitions, Certainty and Inference, we read the following: «If there are several conditions for self-evidence, there are several ways intuitions can fail, and if you have not applied all the conditions to a moral belief, you should not hold it with full confidence. But if you have applied them all, and not found that they fail any? How confident should you be of it then? »
How can one be completely sure of one's convictions at all? And to what extent can one trust intuition?
Although the conceptualist school continued much of the idealistic philosophy after Kant, it was divided in its view of him. It had a more realistic view of morality than Kant, and was more concerned with what was practically feasible. Nevertheless, it saw Kant as the great defender of human autonomy, and worshiped him as the person who, in the best and most fundamental way, had explained why moral questions could not be left solely to the individual subjectivity.
