(THIS ARTICLE IS MACHINE TRANSLATED by Google from Norwegian)
This week, Finn Olstad's 500-page Gerhardsen biography was published, a book documenting the politically schizophrenic "father of the country". On the one hand, he led a party that lay flat on the economic policy of the Marshall Plan, which broke with the official security policy and which made plans for the internment of «5. colonists ». On the other hand, a picture of Gerhardsen is drawn as a security policy brake block – seen from the hawks' point of view – and which admired the Russians.
- Gerhardsen was so enthusiastic about the Soviet Union that he went directly into their reasoning about how the Soviet Union was about to take back the United States economically. He referred to statistics on steel and cement production – even though it was a major deception in Soviet policy. It was not on steel and cement that Eastern Europe lost the Cold War, says Finn Gustavsen to Ny Tid.
He has had the opportunity to skim the Gerhardsen biography, and points out that security policy and economic policy appear to be the most important elements. – We see the grotesque lying about the secret services and about base politics, Gustavsen states.
This week, American researchers uncovered the countries in which the United States deployed nuclear weapons during the Cold War (see pages 4-5 in today's Ny Tid). Norway was not among these countries. On the other hand, Nike and Honest John rockets were deployed in 1957 in various places in Norway.
"Even then, we documented with the help of American sources that these rockets were useless without nuclear charges, because they were so imprecise," says Finn Gustavsen. Finn Olstad's book just confirms that people in government circles thought along the same lines: «Andreas Andersen was convinced that the military thought like this: If you have a piano, you get a cow. Once we acquired the rockets, we would sooner or later also gain access to nuclear charges to make them effective. "
In the winter of 1996/97, a journalist in Nordlands Framtid, Ståle Hansen, also revealed that concrete plans were prepared for – and money was allocated to – nuclear weapons depots in Norway. One of them was also built, at Bodø airport in 1959/60. The area was guarded by American soldiers, in violation of Norwegian base policy.
Finn Gustavsen believes SF's entry with two representatives to the Storting in 1961 may have been a contributing reason why the plans never came forward:
- My theory is that the deployment of nuclear weapons then became too risky, because we had this as our main interest, and we had the expertise. If there had been a softening, we could have revealed it. After the U2 affair, when I was the editor of Orientering, we could establish that the planes had been on a number of visits to Norway. It was widely known on the street in Bodø, and we got many phones from people who knew it. With SF at the Storting there was an apparatus for picking up such things.
Although Einar Gerhardsen apparently sanctioned important changes in security policy, Olstad's biography confirms that he was under pressure from other forces in the party.
- Gerhardsen fought hard for a Nordic defense union, but was sabotaged by Foreign Minister Halvard Lange. The USA was also asked to put pressure on Gerhardsen, Gustavsen sums up. One question that was raised in connection with Nordic co-operation was whether one would be allowed to buy weapons from the USA. Halvard Lange made sure that the Americans' answer was no.
The same Lange was among those who during the Torp government fought for the stationing of American aircraft in Denmark and Norway. It would be a dramatic break with base policy. Here, Gerhardsen helped stop the advance, in the Storting's expanded foreign affairs committee on 17 June 1952. Of the 23 members, only three supported the government's flight plans. This means that the bourgeoisie also defended the base policy – against the wishes of the Labor government!
The biography also documents how US economic policy, with the help of the Marshall Plan, was stepped down after post-war Norway. The rationalization laws were among the Labor plans Gerhardsen was passionate about, but which were set aside following "advice" from the Marshall Mission. "Einar Gerhardsen had emerged as the main proponent of laws that would give the government authority to regulate prices and production," Olstad writes, and states: "In 1952 […] it became his task to oversee the funeral."
In September 1952, the Marshall Mission sent a comprehensive productivity program – "Planning for Productivity" following the American pattern to the Minister of Trade Brofoss. "This presupposed that the companies played the main role and that the authorities contented themselves with creating a 'good climate' for productivity work," Olstad writes. This quickly became the government's line, in favor of the radical plans that a committee under LO lawyer Gustav Sjaastad had formulated.
- The Marshall Plan strongly interfered with economic policy Einar Gerhardsen placed enormous emphasis on, Finn Gustavsen states: – At this time, there were at least ten American economic experts in the Ministry of Finance, who forced through their policy. But Gerhardsen never admitted to the Marshall Mission's interference and the United States' dictates of Norwegian politics.
Gustavsen believes that it was at this time that Gerhardsen "almost lost his balance". The war psychosis in connection with the Korean War coincided with the effects of the Marshall Plan: – It was in 1950/51 that the hysteria and fear of the Soviet Union's expansion hit Einar Gerhardsen seriously.
The consequences of the war psychosis were military rearmament – Olstad points out that the smallest decision was seen in a state of emergency. Einar Gerhardsen, for his part, warned against "espionage, sabotage and coups by 5th colonists within the country's borders". He then referred to the fact that "we can count on 75 adults on that front" – and thus included the Communist Party's electorate.
Thus, the basis for monitoring the Norwegian left-hand side was laid. In the summer of 1951, Justice Minister OCGundersen tells us that there was an A-list with 100 persons who should be apprehended before a mobilization, and a B-list with further 300 to be secured by mobilization. Gundersen has on several occasions since denied this. Gerhardsen was, says Olstad, concerned that the internment lists were full enough: “You have to take so many that you get with 2. and 3. pool of the illegal management. "
It links to another, recently published book. Researcher Sven G. Holtsmark has written "History of Powerlessness" about the GDR in Norway up to 1973. It is about the GDR's involvement with Norwegian politicians, especially with a view to recognition of the East German state. SF as a party, and former SF leader Knut Løfsnes in particular, are devoted to much of the space.
Thus Holtsmark ends a project that went directly into the controversy surrounding the Lund Commission in 1995 / 96. Through "revelations" from East German archives Holtsmark's work helped to pour water on the mill for the commission's opponents.
Finn Gustavsen states to Ny Tid that Holtsmark has not found what he was looking for – a justification for monitoring the Socialist People's Party. Gustavsen says he is surprised by the extent of Knut Løfsnes' contacts with GDR representatives, but nevertheless emphasizes that these do not justify the monitoring SF and Løfsnes were subjected to either.
- What material is found is mostly Knut's own political views. No one in SF disclosed secret material. In any case, we did not have access to that, says Gustavsen.
